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A proof-theoretic analysis and new arithmetical semantics are proposed for some para-
consistent C-systems, which are a relevant sub-class of Logics of Formal Inconsistency
(LFIs) introduced by W.A. Carnielli et al. (2002, 2005) [8,9]. The sequent versions BC,
CI, CIL of the systems bC, Ci, Cil presented in Carnielli et al. (2002, 2005) [8,9] are
introduced and examined. BC, CI, CIL admit the cut-elimination property and, in general,
a weakened sub-formula property. Moreover, a formal notion of constructive paraconsistent
system is given, and the constructivity of CI is proven. Further possible developments
of proof theory and provability logic of CI-based arithmetical systems are sketched,
and a possible weakened Hilbert’s program is discussed. As to the semantical aspects,
arithmetical semantics interprets C-system formulas into Provability Logic sentences of
classical Arithmetic PA (Artemov and Beklemishev (2004) [2], Japaridze and de Jongh
(1998) [19], Gentilini (1999) [15], Smorynski (1991) [22]): thus, it links the notion of
truth to the notion of provability inside a classical environment. It makes true inﬁnitely
many contradictions B ∧ ¬B and falsiﬁes many arbitrarily complex instances of non-
contradiction principle ¬(A ∧ ¬A). Moreover, arithmetical models falsify both classical
logic LK and intuitionistic logic LJ, so that a kind of metalogical completeness property
of LFI-paraconsistent logic w.r.t. arithmetical semantics is proven. As a work in progress,
the possibility to interpret CI-based paraconsistent Arithmetic PACI into Provability Logic
of classical Arithmetic PA is discussed, showing the role that PACI arithmetical models
could have in establishing new meta-mathematical properties, e.g. in breaking classical
equivalences between consistency statements and reﬂection principles.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper we propose a global proof-theoretic analysis of some paraconsistent C-systems, which are one of the primary
sub-classes of the paraconsistent Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and, furthermore, we present a semantics expressing
their constructive nature. Such semantics is deﬁned through new arithmetical models, where Provability Logic of classical
Arithmetic is used to interpret paraconsistent logic: thus, e.g., even if it could seem paradoxical, it will make true some
contradictions. We deem that both syntax and semantics proposed in these articles make the C-systems suitable to support
an interesting kind of paraconsistent mathematics.
We recall that Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and their sub-class of C-systems have been introduced by W.A. Carnielli
and other authors [8–11], and that their language is the extension of the classical one through a monadic propositional
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172 P. Gentilini / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 171–202connective ◦(.). The intended meaning of ◦B is “B is consistent” that is “〈〈B and not B〉〉 does not hold”. Thus, ◦B is a kind of
formal translation of a meta-theoretic statement at the object language level, as for the provability predicate PrT(.) happens
inside arithmetical systems. We call the formulas of the form ◦B local consistency assertions. As we shall see, the monadic
connective ◦(.) plays an essential role in the new sequent rules introducing paraconsistent negation.
In the ﬁrst part, the sequent versions BC, CI,CIL of the systems bC, Ci, Cil presented in [8,9] are introduced and examined
(Sections 2–5). As to the reasons of the selection of bC, Ci and Cil1 in the C-system class, we refer to Section 1.1. We show
that BC, CI,CIL admit the cut-elimination property and, in general, a weakened sub-formula property. On such results our
research program can be founded, aiming to further investigate C-system based paraconsistent Arithmetic.
We remark that bC is the basic system in the hierarchy of C-systems considered here, and the corresponding sequent
version BC (Section 3) has proper non-classical negation rules on the left side, some of them requiring constraint formulas
of the form ◦F in the premise. bC is the minimal Cmin plus ◦A → (A → (¬A → B)) [9], and no theorem of bC has the
form ◦A: coherently, no rule of BC introduces the connective ◦(.). It is worth noting that both ◦(.) and the propositional
negation ¬ result as intensional logical operators: this property has already been proved in [4] through Provability Logic
tools, but is explicitly shown at the semantical level by arithmetical models in Sections 7, 8. In particular we shall see that
the paraconsistent negation has in general a Π1-complexity in the classical sense.
The most expressive system in the hierarchy is Ci, which is bC plus ¬◦A → A ∧ ¬A and has a relevant set of theorems
of the form ◦A. Thus, the corresponding sequent version CI (Section 4) has a proper rule introducing ◦(.). ◦B is neither bC-
nor Ci-equivalent to ¬(B ∧ ¬B). Then, CI maintains the intensional distinction between ◦(.) and the remaining connectives.
The system Cil is Ci plus ¬(A ∧ ¬A) → ◦A, it is close to the seminal system C1 of Da Costa [12] and deﬁnes ◦(.) as
¬(B ∧ ¬B) ↔ ◦B: this fact makes Cil less expressive than Ci. However, Cil has a more powerful negation and the sequent
version CIL (Section 5) is obtained from CI by adding a further constrained negation rule on the left side.
The proof-theoretic analysis performed in Sections 3, 4, 5 allows a comparison between BC, CI, CIL and the sequent
versions of intuitionistic logic, and leads to an exploration of the notion of constructivity for paraconsistent logic. Then, in
Section 6, starting from the suggestions that arise from the literature on duality between paraconsistency and intuitionism
(see, e.g., Brunner and Carnielli [5], Urbas [25], Aoyama [1]) a deﬁnition of constructive paraconsistent system is proposed,
based on the properties of sequent negation rules. A hierarchy in constructivity is given for systems in the LFI language,
that distinguishes pseudo-constructive, declaratively constructive and canonically constructive paraconsistent systems. To the
last grade also a semantical requirement contributes, i.e. the fact that the system admits arithmetical models such that
negation is interpreted as unprovability condition, that is, in general, the interpretation ϕ gives ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)). It is
proven that CI is a canonically constructive paraconsistent system.
The proof theory of C-systems is also the main step to deﬁne a paraconsistent Arithmetic admitting proofs with suitable
regularity properties, in order to develop both Provability Logic and Proof Theory of a possible constructive paraconsistent
Mathematics founded on Logics of Formal Inconsistency. Indeed, as sketched in Section 10, the CI-based Arithmetic PACI,
already introduced in [14], may have new interesting properties as to the PACI-unprovability of PACI-non-triviality. Thus, as
discussed in Section 10.1, an LFI-based weakened Hilbert program could be formulated, and a comparison is possible with
the proposal by Meyer and Mortensen [20] about a renewed Hilbert program based on paraconsistent Relevant Arithmetic R.
As to the introduced arithmetical semantics (Sections 7, 8) of BC, CI and CIL, the arithmetical models falsify both classical
logic LK and intuitionistic logic LJ (Section 9), so that a kind of metalogical completeness property of LFI-paraconsistent
logic w.r.t. arithmetical models is proven. We refer to the introduced semantics as a constructive arithmetical semantics since
it interprets C-system formulas into Provability Logic sentences of classical Arithmetic PA (see Section 7 and [2,19,15,22]):
thus, it links the notion of truth to the notion of provability inside a classical environment. However, it makes true in-
ﬁnitely many arbitrarily complex contradictions B ∧ ¬B and falsiﬁes many arbitrarily complex non-contradiction principle
instances ¬(A ∧ ¬A), and so on. Obviously, inﬁnitely many contradictions result as false in arithmetical semantics too:
therefore, one could say that it shows the constructive nature of some speciﬁc kinds of contradictions B ∧ ¬B . In addition,
as illustrated in Section 11, arithmetical semantics extended to PACI could have a substantial role in order to discover spe-
ciﬁc meta-mathematical properties that paraconsistent arithmetical theories have w.r.t. classical Arithmetic, breaking some
consolidated classical equivalences between important formalized meta-theoretic principles.
In this paper we will focus on the deﬁnition of arithmetical semantics for the propositional part of the systems BC, CI,
and CIL: indeed, the peculiarity of the systems is expressed by the new propositional rules for ¬ and ◦(.), and the main task
of the semantics is the connotation of ¬ and ◦(.) as intensional connectives. The predicative case will be properly treated as
a sub-case of Arithmetic PACI, in the forthcoming work on the interpretation into classical PA-Provability Logic of LFI-based
paraconsistent Arithmetic.
1.1. bC, Ci, Cil: the reasons of a selection
It is worth noting that in [8] also the systems mbC, mCi, mCil are introduced, that essentially differ from bC, Ci,
Cil in the fact that left double negation principle ¬¬B → B is not a theorem. Our preference, as to our main purposes,
1 Cil also belongs to the sub-class of dC-systems, since in it the connective ◦(.) can be deﬁned by the standard connectives, i.e. ¬(B ∧ ¬B) ↔ ◦B is a
Cil-theorem: this fact makes Cil less expressive than Ci, since the local consistency assertions ◦B loose their meta-theoretic character and the intensionality
of ◦(.) collapses into the intensionality of paraconsistent negation.
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paraconsistent Arithmetic based on LFIs, that must be compared with intuitionistic and classical Arithmetic, we must focus
on few expressive C-systems, and, moreover, we have to stress the peculiarity of the intended paraconsistent Arithmetic
w.r.t. intuitionistic Arithmetic. Indeed, we wish to explore the speciﬁc constructive character of an LFI-based Mathematics:
therefore, we must avoid any overlap between the paraconsistent and the intuitionistic perspective. Conversely, we wish
to emphasize the antisymmetric behavior w.r.t. negation that such two fundamental non-classical logics show. Moreover,
a further reason to choose this strategy is that the notion of constructivity for paraconsistent logic introduced in Section 6 is
produced by an abstraction of such antisymmetry. Thus, following the seminal deﬁnition of Da Costa’s system C1 [12], we
admit the principles of left double negation ¬¬B → B and excluded middle A ∨ ¬A in the paraconsistent logics we choose:
as well known, such principles are discharged by intuitionistic logic. On the other hand, we exclude from our selection
any C-system that proves the right double negation principle B → ¬¬B: we assume such principle to be a speciﬁc feature
of (standard) intuitionistic logic. As to the non-contradiction principle ¬(B ∧ ¬B), it is a theorem of intuitionistic logic for
each B , whereas only a proper sub-class of the instances of such principle are proven by LFIs.
1.2. Related works
The main references for Logics of Formal Inconsistency are Carnielli et al. [8] and Carnielli and Marcos [9]; for an exhaustive
overview also Carnielli and Marcos [10,11] and the seminal work of Da Costa [12] are useful. We note that [9] is directly fo-
cused on the C-systems bC, Ci, Cil. For the discussion of the peculiarities of ﬁrst order LFIs we refer to Avron and Zamansky
[3]. On the other hand, the present article is aimed to give the logical basis for a constructive Paraconsistent Arithmetic and
for the systematic development of Paraconsistent Provability Logic: thus, it is remarkably linked to Benassi and Gentilini [4]
and Gentilini [14], where some C-system-based arithmetical systems are ﬁrstly proposed, and the intensional character of
paraconsistent negation is shown through provability logic tools. Since arithmetical semantics developed in Sections 7, 8 uses
classical Provability Logic of PA as a kind of interpretation domain, we refer to Artemov and Beklemishev [2], Japaridze
and de Jongh [19] and Smorynski [22] as canonical overviews on the ﬁeld. As to the proof-theoretic approach to Provability
Logic, that provides some tools for Paraconsistent Provability Logic, we mention Gentilini [15–18]. Our reference for basic
proof theory and cut-elimination is Buss [6,7], with some further devices from Takeuti [23] and Troelstra and Schwichten-
berg [24]. As to the duality between intuitionism and paraconsistency, from which we start in Section 6 for the deﬁnition of
constructivity for paraconsistent logic, we refer to Brunner and Carnielli [5] for a more semantical approach, and to Urbas
[25] and Aoyama [1] for a sequent-based approach. As to the perspective of a conjectural reasoning inside LFI-based Arith-
metic mentioned in Section 11.2, it must be noted that in Forcheri and Gentilini [13] a constructive conjectural calculus
is introduced, emphasizing the deduction features of BC and CI, but the formalization allowed by constructive conjectures
inside PACI would be much stronger, without using labeled formulas.
2. Sequent formalism for the paraconsistent setting
For the language and the Hilbertian formulation of C-systems we refer to [9,8]. The main novelty is the introduction of
the connective ◦(.), such that the intended meaning of ◦B is “B is consistent” that is “〈〈B and not B〉〉 does not hold”. We
call local consistency assertion or circled formula any formula of the form ◦F . B is a classical formula if the connective ◦(.)
does not occur in B . B is a positive classical formula if neither ¬ nor ◦(.) occur in B . By provability logic tools we have
shown in [4] that ¬ and ◦(.) are intensional connectives, and such property will be explicitly declared by the semantics
introduced in Section 7. We shall present here the sequent version of the systems bC, Ci, Cil deﬁned in [9]. Recall that
a sequent S (see [6,7,23,24]) is an expression of the form X  Y where X and Y are ﬁnite (possibly empty) multisets of
formulas. Multisets are sets with “multiplicity”, such that, e.g. {A, B, A} and {A, B} are different multisets, but {A, B} and
{B, A} are the same multiset (see [24, p. 5]). X is called the antecedent of S , Y the succedent of S . We will use the symbols
X, Y ,Λ,Γ, . . . as meta-expressions for multisets of formulas, A, B,C, D, . . . for formulas. The writing Λ,Γ stands for Λ∪Γ
and then A, X  Y is an abbreviation of {A} ∪ X  Y . So that, even if we brieﬂy say that “A occurs in the sequent A, X  Y ”,
we must recall that, in a sequent, formulas never occur but multisets only occur. It is useful to establish a priori a clear
correspondence between the sequent formulation and the Hilbertian formulation of a system: indeed, in a paraconsistent
setting the matter is not so obvious as in the classical case. Thus:
the sequent A1, A2, . . . , An  B1, B2, . . . , Bm
corresponds to the formula ∧i Ai → ∨ j B j and vice versa;
the sequent  B1, B2, . . . , Bm corresponds to the formula ∨ j B j and vice versa;
the sequent A1, A2, . . . , An 
corresponds to the set of formulas {∧i Ai → F : F formula of the language} and vice versa;
the sequent “” corresponds to the set of formulas
{F : F formula of the language}
and vice versa.
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proofs are trees, whose leaves are axioms, and whose branches are formed by sequent rule occurrences. Any root of a tree
in a sequent formulated system is a theorem of the system. We moreover say that any formula A is a theorem of a sequent
system T if the sequent  A is a theorem of T. We say that a sequent formulated system or theory trivializes (or is trivial)
if and only if it proves each sequent of the form  A. A sequent formulated theory T has the bottom particle property if it
proves any sequent of the form B , where B is called a bottom particle for T. If T has the bottom particle property we say
that T is trivial if and only if it proves the empty sequent “”. T is negation consistent if it cannot prove any formula of the
form B ∧ ¬B , negation inconsistent otherwise. In writing formulas we adopt the convention that ∨, ∧, ¬ link more than →,
and that → links more than ↔.
Some remarks must be pointed out on the quantiﬁer rules that should be added to the propositional rules of the
sequent versions of bC, Ci, Cil in order to get the corresponding ﬁrst order predicate systems BC, CI, CIL. The following set
of standard quantiﬁer rules2 is necessary:
[t/x]A,Γ  
∀xA,Γ   ∀ − L,
Γ  , [b/x]A
Γ  ,∀xA ∀ − R
[b/x]A,Γ  
∃xA,Γ   ∃ − L,
Γ  , [t/x]A
Γ  ,∃xA ∃ − R
but it is not enough. Indeed, as discussed in Avron and Zamansky [3], further rules should be added to avoid some
abnormalities in the proof capabilities of the systems, that would have no substantial meaning from the standpoint of
paraconsistency, and would be simply unacceptable. For example, in these systems ∀xA(x) ↔ ∀yA(y) is provable, but
¬∀yA(y) ↔ ¬∀xA(x) is not, and ∀x∀yA(x) ↔ ∀xA(x) is provable, but ¬∀xA(x) ↔ ¬∀x∀yA(x) is not. Therefore, some con-
version rules, identifying formulas that differ only in the names of bound variables or in vacuous quantiﬁer occurrences,
should be added. However, having considered that the proof-theoretic properties of BC, CI, CIL, and the demonstrations of
the cut-elimination theorems (Sections 3–5), essentially depend on the propositional rules, and that arithmetical semantics
(Section 8) is mainly focused on the propositional connectives ¬ and ◦(.), we will examine in this article the sequent sys-
tems BC, CI, CIL only in their propositional parts. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we will maintain the same names for
the propositional parts and their ﬁrst order extensions. The predicate cases will be treated in the next work dedicated to
CI-based Arithmetic PACI: in such context, the study of ﬁrst order properties of BC, CI, CIL acquires a strong motivation, i.e.
the proof-theoretic and semantical analysis of LFI-based paraconsistent Arithmetic.
3. The system BC
In this section we give an exhaustive exposition of the proof theory of BC, corresponding to the Hilbert formulated
C-system bC. Some results on BC have been already presented in [4], but the proofs were only outlined there, since they
were not the main focus of that paper. Conversely, a detailed proof of cut-elimination for BC is presented here, since it
deﬁnes and produces some tools which are necessary for the results on CI and CIL, that are proven in this paper for the
ﬁrst time.
The sequent system BC is the minimal system which expresses some relevant properties of the connective ◦(.) and that
owns remarkably powerful negation rules. Observing the structure of BC-rules an important consideration arises, that will
be conﬁrmed by CI- and CIL-rules: paraconsistency lies on the peculiarity of negation rules introducing a negated formula on the
left side, in this case the ¬ − L1 and ¬ − L3 rules. This remark will be developed in Section 6. The negation rule on the
right side is the classical ¬ − R . As expected, since bC has not theorems of the form ◦F , BC has not rules introducing ◦(.);
however, the negation rule ¬ − L3 with principal formula ¬A has the formula ◦A as a constraint formula in the premise
antecedent.
BC is given by:
BC-axioms: A  A
BC-positive propositional logical rules:
B,Γ  
A ∧ B,Γ   ∧ −L,
B,Γ  
B ∧ A,Γ   ∧ −L,
Γ  , A Λ  X, B
Γ,Λ  , X, A ∧ B ∧ −R
Γ  , A
Γ  , A ∨ B ∨ −R,
Γ  , A
Γ  , B ∨ A ∨ −R,
A,Γ   B,Λ  X
A ∨ B,Γ,Λ  , X ∨ −L
A,Γ  , B
Γ  , A → B → −R,
Γ  , A B,Λ  X
A → B,Γ,Λ  , X → −L
2 Where t is an arbitrary term and b is a free variable which does not occur in Γ , , and t may be not fully quantiﬁed while b must be uniformly
replaced by x, see [23].
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A,Γ  
¬¬A,Γ  ¬ − L1,
◦A,Γ  , A
◦A,¬A,Γ  ¬ − L3
A,Γ  
Γ  ,¬A¬ − R
The formula ◦A in the rule ¬ − L3 will be called the constraint formula of the rule ¬ − L3.
BC-structural rules:
Contraction rules:
Γ  , A, A
Γ  , A C − R,
A, A,Γ  
A,Γ   C − L
Weakening rules:
Γ  
Γ  , A W − R,
Γ  
A,Γ  W − L
Cut rule:
Γ  , A A,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X Cut
We note that the use of multisets of formulas instead of simple sets of formulas allows to consider A, A,Γ   and A,Γ  
as different sequents. However, we immediately infer the latter from the former by a contraction, and the former from the
latter by a weakening. For the sake of simplicity we establish the following convention: in the sequel, in general, the application
of contraction rules will be not explicitly mentioned or indicated. We assume that a contraction rule is applied each time it is necessary,
given the context of the discourse. The same holds as to the contraction elimination.
The rule ¬ − L3 expresses the peculiarity of paraconsistent negation and the link between the paraconsistent negation
and the connective ◦(.). As already pointed out, both connectives can be seen as intensional connectives: for example, in [4]
it is shown that in the BC-based Arithmetic PCA the negation ¬B of a 0-formula B is not a 0-formula.
The classical predicate calculus LK [7,23] can be obtained from BC by replacing the pair ¬ − L3, ¬ − L1, with the rule:
Γ ,A
¬A,Γ ¬ − L2. The rules ¬ − L3, ¬ − L1 are also called proper BC-rules; we also call classical rules the remaining BC-rules.
The intuitionistic predicate calculus LJ [23] can be obtained from LK by imposing that each sequent in a proof-tree has at
most one formula in the succedent. This is essentially a constraint on the classical negation rule on the right ¬ − R , to
discharge the possibility to prove all the sequents  A, ¬A. Thus, sequent formalism shows an antisymmetric behavior of
paraconsistent systems with respect to intuitionistic systems, as to the structure of negation rules: paraconsistent negation
rules are obtained by constraining classical negation on the left ¬− L2; intuitionistic negation rules are obtained by constrain-
ing classical negation on the right ¬ − R , which is restricted to the cases where the premise succedent is empty. In Section 6
we will connect this fact with the already investigated duality between intuitionism and paraconsistency (see, e.g., Brunner
and Carnielli [5]) and with a notion of constructivity for paraconsistent logic.
We recall that the Hilbert formulated system bC is given by the system Cmin (see [9]) plus the axiom schema ◦A → (A →
(¬A → B)). Cmin is given by positive classical logic plus the excluded middle principle A ∨¬A plus the left double negation
principle ¬¬A → A, with the rule of Modus Ponens. The sequent version C–MIN of Cmin is given by LK minus ¬ − L2 plus
¬ − L1. The system C–MIN plus the sequent ◦A,¬A, A  corresponds to bC, as it follows by the relation between sequent
formulation and Hilbert formulation of a system established in Section 2.
Proposition 1. BC is a sequent version of the system bC presented in [9].
Proof. We have in BC:
A  A
◦A, A  A
◦A, A,¬A 
On the other hand, from ◦A,Γ  , A we have by cut, in C–MIN plus ◦A, A,¬A , the sequent ◦A,¬A,Γ  . 
We need to recall some notions of proof theory; our deﬁnitions are similar but not identical to Buss [7], Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg [24] and, subordinately, to Takeuti [23].
Deﬁnition 1. Let U be a system of the set {LK,BC,CI,CIL}. Then:
(i) The depth or height h(P ) of a tree P in U is the highest number of proof-lines in a branch. The grade g(A) of formula
A is the number of occurrences of logical symbols in it.
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C is the sum of the depths of the deductions of the premises.
Deﬁnition 2. Let U be a system of the set {LK,BC,CI,CIL}. Then:
(i) In a rule occurrence R in a proof-tree P in U we call: auxiliary formulas the formula occurrences in the premises on
which the rule acts; principal formula, the formula occurrence produced by the rule in the conclusion. Each formula
in the conclusion of R is called the successor of the formulas in the premises corresponding to it, that are called its
predecessors.
(ii) In a branch of a proof-tree P in U we say that the formula occurrence B is an ancestor of the formula occurrence C
occurring below B in the branch, called a descendant of B , if they are connected by a sequence of predecessor–successor
relations alongside the branch. C is called an integral descendant of B if B and C are the same formula; if C is an integral
descendant of B then B is called a direct ancestor of C . If B has a direct ancestor which is the principal formula of an
inference R different from a contraction, or which occurs in an axiom S , then we say that B is introduced by R (resp.
by S) in P .
Observe that, due to the action of contractions, a formula occurrence A may be introduced in P by a number of different
rules or axioms.
It is well known that the effective cut-elimination procedure for classical logic LK can be described by formulas of
Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA. Thus we can consider it as a mathematical object.
Lemma 1. Let P be any proof in BC of the sequent X  Y . Then, a suitable PRA-formulation F of the cut reductions prescribed by the
cut-elimination procedure for LK (see [7,24]) of cuts having both cut-formulas which are the integral descendants of principal formulas
of LK-rules or axioms exists, such that F can be applied to P , obtaining a BC-proof P ′ of X  Y .
Proof. We have to prove that the application of F to P does not break any proper rule constraint. Let C be an uppermost
cut-occurrence in P :
Q 1
Γ  , A
Q 2
A,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X C
· · ·
where Q 1 and Q 2 are the P -sub-proofs of the premises. By hypotheses no cut-formula has a direct ancestor introduced by
a proper BC-rule. Consider the following cases:
1. The cut-formula A has not the form ◦E . Then, consider the following sub-cases:
1.1. The canonical reductions prescribed by F in order to allow the induction on the cut level do not perturb any ¬− L3
constraint. In fact, no direct ancestor of a cut-formula can be the constraint formula of a ¬ − L3 rule, so that the
cut of lower level prescribed by F can be applied in the standard way. Indeed, the standard F -step for reducing a
cut C of the form:
Γ  , B B,Λ  X
B,U  V R
Γ,U  , V C
· · ·
is to produce the following new cut with a lower level:
Γ  , B B,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X R
Γ,U  , V
and the fact that R may be a ¬ − L3 rule is not relevant when B has not the form ◦E .
1.2. The canonical reductions prescribed by F in order to allow the induction on the cutrank do not perturb any ¬− L3
constraint, even if the auxiliary formulas of the inferences introducing the cut-premises have the form ◦E .
Consider for example the following cut:
A,Γ  ,◦ B
Γ  , A → ◦B
Λ  X, A ◦B,U  W
A → ◦B,Λ,U  X,W
Γ,Λ,U  , X,W
and assume that ◦B,U  W is the conclusion of a ¬ − L3 rule having the predecessor of the ◦B-occurrence which
is the → −L right auxiliary formula as constraint formula. The reduction prescribed by F for the induction on the
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Λ  X, A A,Γ  , ◦B
Γ,Λ  , X, ◦B
◦B,U  W
Γ,Λ,U  , X,W
and the mentioned ¬ − L3 occurrence having ◦B,U  W as conclusion is not perturbed.
2. The cut-formula A has the form ◦E , and some direct ancestors of the right cut-formula may be constraint formulas of
possible ¬ − L3 occurrence in Q 2. Then, consider the following sub-cases:
2.1. Assume that both cut-formulas are not introduced by axioms too. Then, both cut-formula occurrences have all direct
ancestors introduced in P by weakenings, since no LK-logical rule has ◦E as principal formula. Therefore, if we in
Q 1 delete all such weakenings, that must be of the form W − R , we get a cut-free proof of Γ  , without breaking
any ¬ − L3 constraint, since ¬ − L3 constraint formulas occur in the antecedent only.
2.2. Assume that cut-formulas are introduced by axioms too. Suppose that the left cut-formula also has direct ancestors
occurring in axioms A  A of Q 1. Then, we replace each A  A with the Q 2-root A,Λ  X and, after deleting the
weakenings W − R introducing in Q 1 the remaining direct ancestors, we get a cut-free proof of Γ , Λ  , X . 
Theorem 1. The system BC admits cut-elimination.
Proof. We consider an uppermost cut C in a proof-tree P in BC and show that it can be replaced by BC-deductions without
cuts. The proof is by induction on the cutrank with a sub-induction on the level of C . Let C be the following cut:
Q 1
Γ  , A
Q 2
A,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X C
· · ·
We previously establish the following preliminary reductions on the tree P : if one of the cut-formulas A of C is the integral
descendant of the principal formula of a weakening rule in P , and no ancestor of A is the constraint formula of a ¬ − L3
rule in P , we delete such weakening. If one of the cut-formulas A of C has all the uppermost ancestors in P introduced
by weakenings, and no ancestor of A is the constraint formula of a ¬ − L3 rule in P , we delete such weakenings, getting a
cut-free proof of a sub-sequent of Γ , Λ  , X .
If the cut-formulas of C can be included in the hypotheses of Lemma 1 we apply the cut reduction allowed by Lemma 1.
In particular, the cases where the cut-formula has the form ◦F have already been considered at point 2 of the proof of
Lemma 1.
Then, we have to consider the cases where at least one direct ancestor of a cut-formula is the principal formula of a
proper BC-rule, so that A must have the form ¬B . Consider these sub-cases:
1. At least one of the sub-proofs Q 1, Q 2 is an axiom. Let the left premise be an axiom of the form A  A. Then, the
conclusion of C has the form: A, Λ  X . Then, we replace C by the right premise. If the right premise is an axiom, we
replace the cut by the left premise.
2. Neither Q 1 nor Q 2 is an axiom and the cut-formula is not principal in at least one of the premises. If the cut-formula
is not on the both sides principal, let us consider for example the premise Z  W , A of the one-premise rule R in Q 1
having the left cut-premise Γ  , A as conclusion. Then we produce the following proof:
Z  W , A A,Λ  X
Z ,Λ  W , X R
Γ,Λ  , X
where the level of the introduced cut is lower than that of C , and the cutrank is the same. If R is a two-premise rule
the reduction is similar, and so it is for the sub-cases in which the right cut-formula is not principal. Note that since A
has the form ¬B , no direct ancestor of A can be the constraint formula of any ¬ − L3 rule.
3. The cut-formula ¬B is principal in both the premises of the cut C . By hypotheses, both occurrences of ¬B are the
principal formulas of negation rules.
3.1. The left premise of C is the conclusion of a ¬ − R rule and the right premise is the conclusion of a ¬ − L1 rule:
¬B,Γ  
Γ  ,¬¬B
B,Λ  X
¬¬B,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X
Then, we replace the cut C with the following proof:
B,Λ  X
Λ  X,¬B ¬B,Γ  
Γ,Λ  , X
where the cutrank is lower.
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B,Γ  
Γ  , ¬B
◦B,W  X, B
◦B,¬B,W  X
◦B,Γ,W  , X
Then we replace the cut C with the following proof:
◦B,W  X, B B,Γ  
◦B,Γ,W  , X
where the cutrank is lower. 
We have a standard sub-formula property for BC.
Proposition 2. Let P be a cut-free BC-proof. Then, if formula A occurs in P , it also occurs in the P -root.
Proof. The conclusions of the proper BC-rules have the sub-formula property w.r.t. the respective premises. Therefore, the
property holds as for the classical logic LK. 
A further remark is that in the proofs of BC, logical axioms cannot be reduced to the atomic case, as in the classical logic
LK happens. Indeed, by cut-elimination we see that, in general, any sequent ¬B  ¬B cannot be proved in BC by employing
atomic axioms only, and the same holds for CI and CIL.
Proposition 3. BC has the bottom particle property.
Proof. Consider the BC-theorem ◦A ∧ ¬A ∧ A . Thus, ◦A ∧ ¬A ∧ A is a bottom particle for BC for any A. Moreover, for
each arbitrary pair A, F of formulas ◦A ∧¬A ∧ A ∧ F is a bottom particle for BC, and, by ¬− L1, ¬2k(◦A ∧¬A ∧ A ∧ F ) is a
bottom particle too for each k. 
4. The system CI
As we know from [9,8] Ci can be axiomatized as bC plus ¬◦A → A ∧ ¬A. We consider Ci, and then the corresponding
sequent system CI proposed here, as the most interesting C-system: it proves relevant properties of the connective ◦(.)
without producing any equivalence between ◦B and any classical formula. On the other hand, it has strong negation rules,
even if it remains acceptably away from classical logic LK. CI has the rule R Ci that properly introduces the connective ◦(.).
Differently, no rule of BC introduces ◦(.). As shown in [9] in CI an elegant form of strong negation ∼ can be deﬁned as
∼ A ↔ (¬A ∧ ◦A), that behaves as a classical negation: as a consequence, classical inference of LK can be encoded into CI
by a map t from LK-proofs to CI-proofs such that t(¬B) is ∼ t(B) (see [9, p. 51]).
The system CI is given by adding to BC the following proper CI-rules:
Γ  , ◦A
¬◦A,Γ  ¬ − L4,
A ∧ ¬A,Γ  
Γ  , ◦A R Ci
In the rule R Ci the formula A∧¬A in the premise antecedent is the R Ci-auxiliary formula, the formula ◦A in the conclusion
succedent is the R Ci-principal formula. Note that the ¬ − L4 rule is the restriction to circled formulas of the classical rule
¬ − L2 for the negation on the left side.
Proposition 4. CI is a sequent version of the system Ci presented in [9].
Proof. Recall that Ci is bC plus ¬◦A → A ∧ ¬A. CI proves ¬◦A  A ∧ ¬A:
A  A
A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ −L
 A,◦ A
¬◦A  A¬ − L4
R Ci,
¬A  ¬A
A ∧ ¬A  ¬A ∧ −L
 ¬A, ◦A
¬◦A  ¬A¬ − L4
R Ci
from which, by ∧ − R , we have ¬◦A  A ∧ ¬A through a cut-free proof.
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(i) V proves each conclusion of any ¬ − L4 rule. Assuming any sequent of the form Γ  , ◦A we have:
Γ  , ◦A ¬
◦A  A ∧ ¬A ◦A, A ∧ ¬A 
¬◦A, ◦A 
¬◦A,Γ  
where in the uppermost cut the right premise is a BC-theorem.
(ii) V proves each conclusion of any R Ci-rule: from any sequent of the form A ∧ ¬A,Γ  , the axiom ¬◦A  A ∧ ¬A
immediately gives by cut the sequent ¬◦A,Γ  , from which, by ¬ − R , the sequent Γ  ,¬¬◦A is derived. Then,
by the BC-theorem ¬¬◦A  ◦A, we get Γ  , ◦A. 
Lemma 2. Let Q be a cut-free proof in CI of the sequent A ∧ ¬A, X  Y . Then we can get from Q a cut-free CI-proof Q ′ of A,
¬A, X  Y .
Proof. We delete each weakening introducing any direct ancestor of A ∧¬A occurring in the root-antecedent. Thus, we can
suppose that such A ∧ ¬A is introduced by axioms or by ∧ − L rules only. Remark that, by construction, no direct ancestor
of A∧¬A can be the auxiliary formula of an R Ci-rule. Then, we delete in Q each ∧− L rule introducing any A∧¬A-direct
ancestors, and replace each mentioned axiom A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ ¬A with the following proof:
A  A ¬A  ¬A
A,¬A  A ∧ ¬A
Since no constraint of any CI-rule is broken, we get a proof Q ′ of A, ¬A, X  Y , by possibly adding suitable weakenings. 
Lemma 3. Let P be any proof in CI of the sequent X  Y . Then, a suitable PRA-formulation G of the cut reductions prescribed by
the cut-elimination procedure for BC (Theorem 1) of cuts having both cut-formulas which are the integral descendants of principal
formulas of BC-rules or axioms exists, such that G can be applied to P obtaining a CI-proof P ′ of X  Y .
Proof. We recall the proof of Lemma 1 and see that the considerations produced there for LK, F , BC can be extended to
similar considerations for BC, G , CI. The following remarks are useful:
1. The ¬ − L4 rule is a sub-case of the classical ¬ − L2 rule of LK.
2. No cut-formula in P may have a direct ancestor which is the auxiliary formula of an R Ci-rule.
Therefore, the reductions prescribed by G do not collide with CI proper rule occurrences in P . 
Theorem 2. The system CI admits cut-elimination.
Proof. We consider an uppermost cut C in a proof-tree P in CI and show that it can be replaced by CI-deductions without
cuts. The proof is by induction on the cutrank with a sub-induction on the level of C .
Let C be the following cut:
Q 1
Γ  , A
Q 2
A,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X
· · ·
where Q 1 and Q 2 are the P -sub-proofs of the premises.
We establish the preliminary reductions on the tree P that are already mentioned in the proof of the cut-elimination
theorem for BC (Theorem 1), and moreover the following convention: each ¬− L3 rule in P having a formula ◦F as auxiliary
formula is considered as a ¬ − L4 rule, so that it has not constraint formula.
By Lemma 3, the cases that we have to examine are such that at least one occurrence of the cut-formula A also is the
integral descendant of the principal formula of a proper CI-rule. Consider these different cases:
1. At least one of Q 1, Q 2 is an axiom. Then we proceed as in point 1 of the proof of Theorem 1.
2. The cut-formula has the form ¬◦F and the right cut-formula also is the integral descendant of the principal formula of
a ¬ − L4 rule. Note that, by preliminary reductions and conventions, a right cut-formula of the form ¬◦F can be the
integral descendant of ¬ − L4 principal formulas or axioms only. As already remarked, ¬ − L4 is a restriction of the
classical ¬ − L2, and the cut reduction is the same as in the classical case.
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R Ci-rule; we note that the right cut-formula cannot be the principal formula of any logical rule. Then:
3.1. Let us consider the case where the left cut-formula is the principal formula of an R Ci-rule:
Q 1
B ∧ ¬B,Γ  
Γ  , ◦B
Q 2
◦B, V  Y
◦B,Λ  X R
Γ,Λ  , X
We examine the following sub-cases:
3.1.1. The rule R on the right is not a ¬ − L3 rule having the right cut-formula as constraint formula. Therefore,
we produce a cut S between the right C-premise and the R-premise, with level(S) < level(C), and apply the
rule R to the S-conclusion.
3.1.2. The rule R on the right is a ¬ − L3 rule having the right cut-formula ◦B as constraint formula:
Q 1
B ∧ ¬B,Γ  
Γ  , ◦B
Q 2
◦B, V  X, B
◦B,¬B, V  X
¬B,Γ, V  , X
then we produce the following proof:
Q 1
B ∧ ¬B,Γ  
Γ  , ◦B
Q 2
◦B, V  X, B
Γ, V  , X, B
N
B,¬B,Γ  
¬B,Γ, V  , X
where the upper cut is reduced by induction on the level, the end-cut is reduced by induction on the rank.
The right premise of the end-cut is obtained by Lemma 2 as the root of a cut-free CI-proof N from the proof
Q 1 of B ∧ ¬B , Γ  .
3.2. The left cut-formula is not the principal formula in the left cut-premise, and the rule R on the right is not a ¬− L3
rule having the right cut-formula as constraint formula. Then let us consider for example the premise Z  W , ◦B
of the rule G in Q 1 having the left cut-premise Γ  , ◦B as conclusion, supposing that G is a one-premise rule.
Then we produce the following proof:
Z  W , ◦B ◦B,Λ  X
Z ,Λ  W , X G
Γ,Λ  , X
where the level of the introduced cut is lower than that of C , and the cutrank is the same. If G is a two-premise
rule the reduction is similar.
3.3. The left cut-formula is not the principal formula in the left cut-premise, and the rule R on the right is a ¬ − L3
rule having the right cut-formula as constraint formula:
Q 1
Z  W , ◦B
Γ  , ◦B
Q 2
◦B, V  X, B
◦B,¬B, V  X
¬B,Γ, V  , X
Let us consider the sub-proof Q 1 of the left C-premise Γ  , ◦B in P . We observe that, by hypotheses, the
occurrence of ◦B in such premise can be introduced, in the most general case, by a set E of axiom occurrences
of the form ◦B  ◦B and by a set H of R Ci-rule occurrences. Then, we replace each axiom ◦B ◦ B of E with the
proof of the C-premise ◦B,¬B, V  X , and delete each R Ci-rule of H. Thus, we obtain, in the most general case,
a cut-free proof M of B ∧ ¬B , ¬B , Γ, V  , X . Then, we produce the following proof:
M
B ∧ ¬B,¬B,Γ, V  , X
¬B,Γ, V  , X, ◦B
Q 2
◦B, V  X, B
◦B,¬B, V  X
¬B,Γ, V  , X
where the introduced cut is included in the case 3.1.2. 
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way for a cut-free CI-proof. However, a reduced sub-formula property is possible.
Proposition 5. Let A be a formula occurrence in a CI-proof P . Then:
(i) If A has not the form ¬B or B ∧ ¬B then A occurs as sub-formula in the P -root.
(ii) If A has the form ¬B or B ∧ ¬B, then either A occurs as sub-formula in the P -root or ◦B occurs as sub-formula in the P -root.
Proof. It is straightforward. 
It must be stressed that CI cannot deﬁne the connective ◦(.). In particular, the following sequents are CI-provable:
 ◦B → ¬(B ∧ ¬B),  ¬◦B ↔ B ∧ ¬B . But  ¬(B ∧ ¬B) → ◦B is not CI-provable if ◦B is not a CI-theorem, as by cut-
elimination is evident. Moreover, the fact that in Ci the connectives ∧ and ∨ in general do not commute if they occur in the
scope of a ¬ occurrence, becomes evident by properties of proofs in CI: in general, ¬(B ∧ F )  ¬(F ∧ B) (resp. ¬(B ∨ F ) 
¬(F ∨ B)) cannot be CI-provable for each pair 〈B, F 〉 with B different from F , such that  ¬(F ∧ B) (resp.  ¬(F ∨ B)) is
not CI-provable, as by cut-elimination is evident. Moreover, B ∧ ¬B  ¬B ∧ B and B ∨ ¬B  ¬B ∨ B are easily proved in CI
as in the classical LK through positive rules, but neither (i) ¬(B ∧ ¬B)  ¬(¬B ∧ B) nor (ii) ¬(B ∨ ¬B)  ¬(¬B ∨ B) are in
general CI-provable.
Example 1. The following are cut-free proofs in CI of some relevant Ci-theorems:
◦A  ◦A
◦A,¬◦A ¬ − L4
◦A ∧ ¬◦A 
 ◦◦A R Ci
∧ −L
A  A
◦A, A  A W − R
◦A,¬A, A 
◦A,¬A,¬¬A ¬ − L1
¬ − L3
◦A,¬A ∧ ¬¬A  ∧ −L
◦A  ◦¬A R Ci
 ◦A → ◦¬A → −R
A  A
A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ −L
 A, ◦A
 A ∨ ◦A ∨ −R
R Ci
As expected, the set of CI bottom particles properly extends the set of BC bottom particles. For example, each formula
of the form ¬◦◦F is a bottom particle of CI but not of BC.
5. The system CIL
Cil is given by Ci plus ¬(A ∧ ¬A) → ◦A. As in [8] is explained, the C-system Cil is close to the system C1 of Da Costa
[12].3 In Cil the connective ◦(.) remains as primitive in the language, but the equivalence ¬(B ∧¬B) ↔ ◦B is a Cil-theorem:
thus Cil deﬁnes ◦(.) through the remaining standard connectives. As a consequence, differently from bC and Ci, Cil may be
trivialized by classical formulas too. We deﬁne the sequent system CIL as follows:
CI plus
Γ  , A ∧ ¬A
¬(A ∧ ¬A),Γ  ¬ − L5
The rule ¬ − L5 is the proper CIL-rule. In the rule ¬ − L5 the formula A ∧ ¬A in the premise succedent is the ¬ − L5
auxiliary formula, the formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A) in the conclusion antecedent is the ¬ − L5 principal formula.
Proposition 6. CIL is a sequent version of the system Cil presented in [9].
3 Cil can be seen as the system C1 of Da Costa [12] with the exclusion of the so-called consistency propagation axioms (see [8, Section 5.2, Deﬁnition 108]).
182 P. Gentilini / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 171–202Proof. We produce the following canonical CIL-proof Q Cil of the Cil-axiom ¬(A ∧ ¬A) → ◦A:
A  A ¬A  ¬A
A,¬A  A ∧ ¬A ∧ −R
¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A, A 
¬(A ∧ ¬A), A ∧ ¬A  ∧ −L
¬ − L5
¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ◦A R Ci
On the other hand, CI plus ¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ◦A has the same theorems as CIL.
In fact, assuming X  Y , A ∧ ¬A, and recalling that A ∧ ¬A  A is an obvious BC-theorem, we have:
X  Y , A ∧ ¬A A ∧ ¬A  A
X  Y , A Cut
◦A, X  Y , A W − L
◦A,¬A, X  Y ¬ − L3
We employ the conclusion of the derivation above as right premise of the following:
¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ◦A ◦A,¬A, X  Y
¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A, X  Y Cut
¬(A ∧ ¬A), A ∧ ¬A, X  Y ∧ −L
(A ∧ ¬A)∧ ¬(A ∧ ¬A), X  Y ∧ −L
X  Y , ◦(A ∧ ¬A) R Ci
where the left premise is the Cil-axiom. On the other hand, we also have:
X  Y , A ∧ ¬A
◦(A ∧ ¬A), X  Y , A ∧ ¬A W − L
◦(A ∧ ¬A),¬(A ∧ ¬A), X  Y ¬ − L3
from which, by cut with the sequent X  Y , ◦(A ∧ ¬A) obtained above, we get ¬(A ∧ ¬A), X  Y . 
It is worth noting that, as expected, CIL has inﬁnitely many classical bottom particles of arbitrary complexity. In particular,
for each CI bottom particle F having a conjunct of the form ◦B , the replacement of the conjunct ◦B with ¬(B ∧ ¬B) gives
a CIL bottom particle: for example A ∧¬A ∧¬(A ∧¬A) is a CIL bottom particle for each A, and, if A is classical, it is not a
CI-bottom particle. If A has the form ◦B , then it is a CI bottom particle too.
In order to prove the cut-elimination theorem for CIL, we employ the following strategy: the goal is to show that any
CIL-proof P can be transformed into a CIL-proof Q with the same root, such that no cut-formula in Q is introduced by
¬ − L5 rule occurrences.
Lemma 4. Let P be a cut-free proof in CIL of the sequent S ≡ X  Y , A ∧ ¬A. Then, we can obtain from P a cut-free CIL-proof P1 of
X  Y , A and a cut-free CIL-proof P2 of X  Y , ¬A.
Proof. In the most general case the direct ancestors of the occurrence of A ∧ ¬A in S are introduced in P by a set H of
right weakenings, by a set M ≡ {(A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ ¬A)i} of logical axiom occurrences and by a set J ≡ {W jZ j ,A V jU j ,¬AW j ,V jZ j ,U j ,A∧¬A }
of ∧ − R rule occurrences. We produce in P the following reductions: the elements of H are replaced by weakenings that
introduce A; each element of M is replaced by the following proof: AAA∧¬AA ; each rule occurrence of J is replaced by the
proof of the left premise W j  Z j, A. Thus, by adding also possible suitable weakenings, we obtain a proof P1 of X  Y , A.
The construction of P2 is symmetrical. 
Lemma 5. Let P be a cut-free CIL-proof of the sequent S ≡ ¬(A ∧¬A), X  Y . If all direct ancestors of ¬(A ∧¬A) are introduced by
axioms or weakenings only, we can obtain from P a cut-free proof P ′ of the sequent ◦A, X  Y . If the direct ancestors of ¬(A ∧¬A) in
P are also introduced by ¬− L5 rule occurrences, then we can obtain from P a cut-free proof Q of the sequent ◦A,¬A, X  Y , where
no direct ancestor of ¬A is introduced by ¬ − L5 rules.
Proof. First we produce the following canonical cut-free CIL-proof of ◦A  ¬(A ∧ ¬A):
A  A
◦A, A  AW − L
◦A,¬A, A 
◦A, A ∧ ¬A  ∧ −L
¬ − L3
◦ ¬ − RA  ¬(A ∧ ¬A)
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¬(A ∧ ¬A) of S , and let J be the set of left weakenings introducing in P a direct ancestor of the formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A) of S .
We replace each element of H with the canonical proof of ◦A  ¬(A ∧ ¬A) and each element of J with a left weakening
introducing ◦A, getting a proof P ′ of ◦A, X  Y . In the most general case, suppose also that V≡ { W jZ j ,A∧¬A¬(A∧¬A),W jZ j } is the set
of ¬ − L5 rule occurrences introducing in P a direct ancestor of the formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A) of S . We replace each element of
V with the following cut-free proof:
W j  Z j, A
◦A,W j  Z j, A W − L
◦A,¬A,W j  Z j ¬ − L3
where the uppermost sequent is given by Lemma 4, getting a cut-free proof Q of the sequent ◦A,¬A, X  Y . 
Lemma 6. Let P be a cut-free CIL-proof of the sequent S ≡ X  Y ,¬(A ∧ ¬A). Then we can obtain from P a cut-free proof Q of the
sequent X  Y , ◦A.
Proof. In the most general case the direct ancestors of the occurrence of ¬(A ∧¬A) in S are introduced in P by a set H of
right weakenings, by a set M≡ {(¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ¬(A ∧ ¬A))i} of logical axiom occurrences and by a set J≡ { A∧¬A,W jZ jW jZ j ,¬(A∧¬A) }
of ¬ − R rule occurrences. We produce in P the following reductions: each weakening of H is replaced by a weakening
introducing ◦A; each element of M is replaced by the canonical proof Q Cil of ¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ◦A (Proposition 6); each rule
occurrence of J is replaced by the R Ci instance:
A∧¬A,W jZ j
W jZ j ,◦ A . Thus, we obtain a proof Q of X  Y , ◦A. 
Lemma 7. Let Q be a CIL-proof having a cut C with cut-formula of the form ¬(A ∧ ¬A) as end rule, such that the sub-proofs of the
C-premises are cut-free:
Q 1
Γ  ,¬(A ∧ ¬A)
Q 2
¬(A ∧ ¬A),Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X
Then, we can replace Q with a proof H of the following form:
H1
Γ  , ◦A
H2
◦A,Λ  X
Γ,Λ  , X
if the right cut-formula of C has no direct ancestor introduced by a ¬ − L5 rule occurrence, or, in the most general case, with a proof
M of the following form:
M1 M2
Γ  , ◦A ◦A,¬A,Λ  X
M3
Λ  X,¬A ¬A,Γ,Λ  , X
Γ,Λ  , X
where the right cut-formula of the lower cut is not introduced in M by ¬ − L5 rule occurrences.
Proof. The construction of H , i.e. of the cut-free sub-proofs Q 1 and Q 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 5 and 6. In the
construction of M , the cut-free sub-proofs M1 and M2 follow immediately from Lemmas 5 and 6. For the cut-free proof
M3 of the sequent Λ  X,¬A, let us consider the set V ≡ { W jZ j ,A∧¬A¬(A∧¬A),W jZ j } of ¬ − L5 rule occurrences introducing in Q a
direct ancestor of the right cut-formula ¬(A ∧¬A) of C . By Lemma 4, for each premise W j  Z j, A ∧¬A in V we can get a
cut-free proof N j of W j  Z j,¬A. If we replace in Q 2 each element of V with N j , we get a cut-free proof of Λ  X,¬A. 
Corollary 1. Let P be a proof in CIL. Then we can obtain from P a CIL-proof Q where in each uppermost cut no cut-formula is
introduced by a ¬ − L5 rule.
Lemma 8. Let P be any proof in CIL of the sequent X  Y . Then, a suitable PRA-formulationD of the cut reductions prescribed by the
cut-elimination procedure for CI of cuts whose right cut-formula is not the integral descendant of the principal formula of any ¬ − L5
rule exists, such thatD can be applied to P , obtaining a cut-free CIL-proof P ′ of X  Y .
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Theorem 3. The system CIL admits cut-elimination.
Proof. By Corollary 1 we can consider only proof-trees P in CIL such that in any uppermost cut no right cut-formula is
introduced by ¬ − L5 rule occurrences. Then, the thesis follows from Lemma 8. 
CIL too has the reduced sub-formula property.
Proposition 7. Let A be a formula occurrence in a cut-free CIL-proof P . Then:
(i) If A has not the form ¬B or B ∧ ¬B then A occurs as sub-formula in the P -root.
(ii) If A has the form ¬B or B ∧ ¬B, then either A occurs as sub-formula in the P -root or ◦B occurs as sub-formula in the P -root.
The proof is the same as for CI.
Here are some simple cut-free proofs of signiﬁcant CIL-theorems.
Consider S ≡ ¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ¬(¬A ∧ A), asserting a partial commutation of ∧ inside the scope of ¬ for any arbitrary A:
A  A ¬A  ¬A
A,¬A  A ∧ ¬A ∧ −R
¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A, A 
¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A ∧ A  ∧ −L
¬ − L5
¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ¬(¬A ∧ A) ¬ − R
On the other hand, by cut-elimination is evident that the converse ¬(¬A∧ A)  ¬(A∧¬A) is not, in general, a CIL-theorem,
since ¬A∧ A cannot be the auxiliary formula of a ¬− L5 rule. Moreover, S is not, in general, a CI-theorem (Section 4). Thus,
as expected, the set of CIL-theorems in classical language properly extends the set of CI-theorems in classical language. This
is already evident, by cut-elimination, for the conclusion of any simplest instance of the ¬ − L5 rule: the sequent ¬(p ∧
¬p),¬p, p , with p atom, is not a CI-theorem. The following is a cut-free proof of the relevant CIL-theorem ◦(A ∧ ¬A):
A  A ¬A  ¬A
A,¬A  A ∧ ¬A ∧ −R
¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A, A 
¬(A ∧ ¬A), A ∧ ¬A  ∧ −L
¬ − L5
(A ∧ ¬A)∧ ¬(A ∧ ¬A)  ∧ −L
 ◦(A ∧ ¬A) R Ci
Observe that neither (A ∧ ¬A) ∧ ¬(A ∧ ¬A) nor ¬(A ∧ ¬A) occur as sub-formulas in the root, but the reduced sub-
formula property (Proposition 7) is respected, since ◦(A ∧ ¬A) occurs in the root. Moreover, by cut-elimination we see
that  ◦(A ∧ ¬A) cannot be the root of any CI-proof for any classical formula A. Then, by ¬ − L4, we see that, for any
classical A, ¬◦(A ∧ ¬A) is a non-classical CIL bottom particle which is not a CI bottom particle. From the R Ci-premise of
the proof above, by ¬ − R , we have  ¬((A ∧ ¬A)∧ ¬(A ∧ ¬A)) as CIL-theorem for each A: thus, if A ranges over classical
formulas, CIL proves inﬁnitely many classical instances of the non-contradiction principle.
6. A notion of constructivity for paraconsistency: CI as a constructive logic
6.1. Heuristic preliminaries and suggestions from the literature
Let us suppose to examine a sequent system W whose theorems are included in that of classical logic LK, and whose
rules are obtained by weakening or constraining some LK-rules. Let’s suppose to ask the following question, from a heuristic
standpoint, forgetting the thousands of papers that have been written about constructive logic in the last century: what are
the minimal properties that W must have to be a “constructive” logical system? Our intuition would propose such necessary
conditions: (i) some negation rules of W are constrained w.r.t. the negation rule of LK; (ii) W admits cut-elimination. The
more relevant condition is (i): it reﬂects our seminal insight that, ﬁrst of all, in a constructive logic, negation cannot be used
as in the classical setting. As to (ii), it is quite natural: we remark that, in general, each effective proof-search strategy for the
W-proof of a given sequent S requires the cut-elimination property. After this, if we also consider the historical development
of the idea of constructive logic, we must observe that it is strictly linked to intuitionistic logic and its subsystems. Moreover,
intuitionistic logic respects the above mentioned conditions: LJ has the cut-elimination property, and has a constrained right
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A,Γ 
Γ  ¬A¬ − R
where the premise succedent must be empty. Note that this is a speciﬁc proper constraint, qualifying intuitionistic logic.
Indeed, even if the easy formulation of LJ says that the rules are such that each end sequent in a proof has at most a
singleton as succedent, in the Maehara sequent version of intuitionistic logic (see [23, p. 52]) the only constraint is that the
critical rules ¬ − R,→ −R,∀ − R are allowed only if the principal formula is the only formula in the conclusion succedent.
However, though important historical justiﬁcations could support it, we reject the identiﬁcation between intuitionistic logic and
constructive logic. That is, we think that different approaches to constructivism in logic can exist: a ﬁrst one can emphasize
the criticism to the excluded middle principle, while a second one could develop the criticism to the non-contradiction
principle. We deem that today (and not one century ago) both positions have relevant mathematical motivations. Thus, we
are searching for a satisfactory characterization of a class of paraconsistent logics as constructive logics. Obviously, the mere para-
consistency without further conditions cannot give constructivity: in our opinion only a very peculiar class of paraconsistent
logics could be said constructive.
Preliminarily, though rejecting identiﬁcation, the strong connection between intuitionistic logic and constructivism must
be considered. That is, we assume that in principle, a paraconsistent constructive logic U should present a canonical link
with an intuitionistic logic V, that we call the reference system for U, such that, essentially, the negation rules of the sequent
version of U can be obtained through suitable canonical transformations from the negation rules of the sequent version
of V. This is a heuristic ideal requirement that will be made technical in the sequel. In order to get some suggestions for
the deﬁnition of such canonical link, it can be useful to examine the well studied duality relations between intuitionistic and
paraconsistent logic. Note however that we will maintain as separate notions the canonical link between any paraconsistent
system U and its possible intuitionistic reference system V (for which we are searching a suitable formal deﬁnition), and
the duality relation between intuitionistic and paraconsistent logic (which is a canonical topic).
A ﬁrst kind of duality relation studied in the literature is based on the role of logical connectives; we call it connective-
duality relation and it is studied, for example, in Brunner and Carnielli [5]. In [5] multiple deductive systems S ≡ (L,S )
are considered where L is a propositional language and S is a consequence relation such that, if Γ and  are sets of L-
formulas, the intended meaning of Γ S  is that, assuming the conjunction of the propositions of Γ , at least one element
of  holds; moreover, Γ S  is closed under the usual structural rules (weakening, cut) of sequent calculus, once the
identiﬁcation between Γ S  and the sequent Γ   is accepted, and a deduction theorem for S holds. The dualization
operation (.)∗ gives the dual connectives of the standard propositional ones in this way: ⊥∗ ≡ , (A ∧ B)∗ ≡ A∗ ∨ B∗ ,
(A ∨ B)∗ ≡ A∗ ∧ B∗ , (A → B)∗ ≡ A∗ − B , (¬A)∗ ≡  − A∗ where “−” is the (intensional) pseudo-difference or coimplication
connective, such that D − E has the heuristic meaning “D but not E” (see also [25,1]). A dual consequence relation S∗ can
be deﬁned, such that the dual deductive system S∗ ≡ (L∗,S∗ ) has the following property: Γ ∗ S∗ ∗ if and only if  S Γ .
Moreover, the (connective-)dual logic of an intuitionistic logic is always a paraconsistent logic [5, p. 169].
What suggestions arise from the results presented in Brunner and Carnielli [5] on the connective-duality between in-
tuitionism and paraconsistency? If we see the consequence statement  S Γ as the end sequent   Γ of a proof in a
sequent formulation of S (assuming that a deduction theorem holds) the connective-duality is expressed by an exchange
antecedent/succedent (i.e. left/right) in the sequents and by a change standard/dual in the connectives: if Γ   is the root
of a proof in the intuitionistic system S , then ∗  Γ ∗ is the root of the dual proof in the paraconsistent dual S∗ . Therefore,
we can accept the following suggestion: the canonical link between a paraconsistent constructive logic U and its reference system
V should express a kind of antisymmetry between the negation rules of the sequent versions of U and V.
A second kind of duality relation studied in the literature, is directly deﬁned starting from the sequent version of in-
tuitionistic logic: we call it sequent-duality relation. In this way, for example, the paraconsistent systems LDJ of Urbas [25]
and DI of Aoyama [1] are deﬁned. Since the two systems are similar, we will focus on LDJ. LDJ can be obtained from the
standard intuitionistic sequent system LJ, where each sequent in a proof has at most a singleton as succedent, through the
converse condition: in LDJ each sequent in a proof has at most a singleton as antecedent. LDJ is called a dual-intuitionistic
sequent system [25, p. 440]. Let’s consider the negation rules of LDJ:
 , A
¬A  ¬ − L,
A  
 ,¬A¬ − R
the proper constraint is in ¬ − L: the negated formula can be introduced in the conclusion antecedent only if the premise
antecedent is empty. Remark that ¬ − L of LDJ can be obtained from ¬ − R of LJ by exchanging antecedent and succedent
in the sequents, i.e. left side and right side. The systems presented in [25] and [1] give an important contribution to the
investigation of sequent-duality between paraconsistency and intuitionism. The relevance of LDJ is in the exempliﬁcation of
the duality, and it is not diminished by the below considerations on the intrinsic proof-theoretic features of LDJ, which are
an independent topic.
Thus, sequent-duality conﬁrms what we already observed in deﬁning the sequent systems BC, CI, CIL: in general,
negation rules of paraconsistent systems must have constraints on the left side of the premise. However, we note that
paraconsistent systems obtained from intuitionistic logic only by a left/right exchange in the sequents, do not offer an expres-
sive and informative paraconsistency. LDJ does not prove the formalized modus ponens A∧ (A → B)  B , so that positive logic
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A ∧ ¬A  is provable too, and this is a weak form of paraconsistency. As to a possible constructivity, the fact that to each
theorem B a contradiction B ∧ ¬B corresponds that trivializes LDJ, independently of the information included in B , does
not seem a constructive feature for a paraconsistent system.
From the examined sequent-duality relation we can derive two types of suggestions. The ﬁrst one conﬁrms that between
the sequents of the negation rules of any paraconsistent constructive system U and those of its intuitionistic reference sys-
tem V, a kind of antisymmetry relation should hold. The second one is a negative reﬂexion: the empty antecedent condition
for the ¬− L rule is a little informative constraint, giving a poor paraconsistency, which is in addition not much constructive,
assuming that constructive implies effectively informative. The same does not hold for the empty succedent condition in the
¬− R rule of intuitionistic logic LJ, and this is not odd, since intuitionism has completely different inferential requirements.
Thus, taking into account the deﬁnition of negation rules for BC, CI, CIL already presented in the previous sections, we
generalize the notion of constraint formula for the ¬− L rules of a paraconsistent sequent system U: in general, we say that
U has the constraint formula property if at least one of the ¬ − L rules of U has the form:
δ, X  , A
¬A, δ, X  
where the formula δ is neither a theorem nor a bottom particle of U and is the constraint formula of the rule. δ is effectively
informative: it declaratively expresses the distance between the system U and classical logic LK. The case of the empty
antecedent constraint can be seen as the limit case of the trivial constraint formula.
6.2. Formal deﬁnition of constructive paraconsistency
We now proceed to formalize the heuristic considerations presented above. We assume to work always with sequent
formulated system. We have said that, in order to deﬁne a general notion of constructive logic, we focus on the negation
rules of the system. However, in our opinion, the notion of constructivity is linked not only to the necessity of constraining
classical negation, but also to the inclusion in the system of adequately powerful negation rules. Only systems with a
suﬃciently expressive negation allow interesting constructive inference. Thus, any positive fragment of classical logic LK
could be said constructive only in the sense of trivially constructive. But we think that, for example, also the system given by
positive(LK) plus A,Γ ¬¬A,Γ¬− L1 cannot be qualiﬁed as a constructive paraconsistent system since ¬− L1 allows a too weak
use of negation. Then, we will discuss about constructivity only for paraconsistent systems endowed by diagonal negation
rules:
Deﬁnition 3. A sequent rule introducing negation is diagonal if the auxiliary formula is at the left (right) side of the premise
and the principal formula is at the right (left) side of the conclusion. We call left (right) diagonal negation rules those with
the principal formula at the left (right) side of the conclusion.
We will focus on diagonal negation rules. The notion is clear: a diagonal negation rule not only introduces one or more
occurrences of ¬, but also moves the formula, changing the sequent side at which it occurs. A relevant class of diagonal
negation rules is given by rules with the constraint formula property:
Deﬁnition 4.
(i) A left diagonal negation rule of a system U has the constraint formula property if it has the following form:
Φ,Γ  , A
¬A,Φ,Γ  H
where exactly one of the following cases holds:
(a) the set Φ is empty, and A is a ﬁxed formula schema Λ;
(b) no constraints are posed on A and the set Φ is a singleton including a ﬁxed formula schema Σ , such that inﬁnitely
many instances of Σ are neither theorems nor bottom particles of U. In each H-instance, the Σ-instance δ is called
the constraint formula of the rule instance.
(ii) A right diagonal negation rule of a system U has the constraint formula property if it has the following form:
B,Γ  ,Ψ
Γ  ,Ψ,¬BR
where exactly one of the following cases holds:
(c) the set Ψ is empty and B is a ﬁxed formula schema Θ;
(d) no constraints are posed on B and the set Ψ is a singleton including a ﬁxed formula schema Π , such that inﬁnitely
many instances of Π are neither theorems nor bottom particles of U. In each H-instance, the Π -instance σ is called
the constraint formula of the rule instance.
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examples and by the suggestions given by the paraconsistency/intuitionism dualities. The assumption is the following: we
deem that paraconsistent systems are characterized by left diagonal negation rules having proper constraints on the left side
(for example the ¬− L3 rule) and that intuitionistic systems are characterized by right diagonal negation rules having proper
constraints on the right side (for example the empty premise succedent condition in ¬ − R of LJ), with the speciﬁcation
that, in some cases, the constraint is given by a ﬁxed formula schema for the auxiliary formula: in such cases, the constraint
imposes a particular form of the principal formula of the rule, i.e. at the left side of the conclusion in paraconsistent systems,
and at the right side of the conclusion in (pseudo-)intuitionistic systems. For these reasons we establish that it is relevant
to formalize left diagonal rules constrained on the left, and right diagonal rules constrained on the right. BC, CI, CIL provide
examples of left diagonal rules with the constraint formula property:
◦A,Γ  , A
◦A,¬A,Γ  ¬ − L3,
Γ  , ◦A
¬◦A,Γ  ¬ − L4,
Γ  , A ∧ ¬A
¬(A ∧ ¬A),Γ  ¬ − L5
¬ − L3 is in the case (b) of the deﬁnition and the schema Σ is ◦A. ¬ − L4 and ¬ − L5 are in the case (a) of the deﬁnition,
where the constraint is conveyed by the auxiliary formula. The schemas Λ are respectively ◦A and A ∧ ¬A. Note that
all these systems have the right diagonal negation rule A,Γ 
Γ ,¬A¬ − R which has not the constraint formula property.
The following right diagonal negation rule:
• A,ΩΠ
ΩΠ,¬• A¬ − R4, where •(.) is the black circle connective of Logic of Formal
Inconsistency, has the constraint formula property with the constraint conveyed by the ﬁxed schema •A of the auxiliary
formula, so that the principal formula, at the right side of the conclusion, has the particular form ¬•A.
At this point, recalling what already sketched in Section 6.1, we can produce a formal counterpart of the idea that
a constructive paraconsistent system U should have an intuitionistic reference system V from which the negation rules of
U can be obtained through canonical manipulations. Essentially, we can expect a kind of antisymmetry relation between
premises and conclusions of the diagonal negation rules of the two systems, linking left diagonal negations of U to right
diagonal negations of V. This imposes to enlarge the class of intuitionistic systems to that of pseudo-intuitionistic systems,
deﬁned below. The technical reason is simple: the standard right diagonal negation of intuitionistic systems, with the empty
premise succedent condition, does not allow to get, by antisymmetry, interesting left diagonal negation rules, i.e. interesting
paraconsistent systems.
Deﬁnition 5. Let V be a sequent system in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency, including the positive rules of
classical logic LK and endowed by diagonal negation rules. Then V is a pseudo-intuitionistic system if it has cut-elimination
and, moreover, inﬁnitely many instances of the excluded middle principle B ∨ ¬B and of the left double negation principle
¬¬B → B are not V-provable.
Note that intuitionistic logic LJ itself does not reject all the instances of the mentioned principles: it proves inﬁnitely
many excluded middle instances and left double negation instances (from each LJ-provable B , the sequents  B ∨ ¬B ,
¬¬B  B are provable, and from each LJ-provable  A the sequents  A ∨ ¬A, ¬¬A  A are provable). Moreover, LFIs lan-
guage includes classical language, so that Deﬁnition 5 obviously concerns also the pseudo-intuitionistic systems in classical
language.
Then, a pseudo-intuitionistic system may have right diagonal negation rules which are constrained in many various ways,
and not only by the empty premise succedent condition. Moreover, constraint formula properties are possible.
Deﬁnition 6. Let H be a left diagonal negation rule of a sequent system U in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency.
Then the negation-dual rule E of H is a right diagonal negation rule so deﬁned:
(i) if H has not the constraint formula property, i.e. it has the form:
Γ  , A
¬A,Γ  H
then E has the form:
B,Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬B E
(ii) if H has the constraint formula property, i.e. it has the form:
Φ,Γ  , A
¬A,Φ,Γ  H
where Φ and A have the properties established by Deﬁnition 4, then:
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¬Λ,Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬¬ΛE
(b) if Φ is not empty then E has the form:
B,Ω  Π,¬Σ
Ω  Π,¬Σ,¬B E
where Σ is the formula schema included in the singleton Φ .
Therefore: when the rule H has not the constraint formula property its negation-dual E is obvious. The interesting
case arises when H has the constraint formula property: in such case the constraint formula schema of E is obtained by
changing side and adding a negation connective ¬ to the constraint formula schema of H (that may coincide with the
auxiliary formula, as the case (a) above shows). Thus, we apply an antisymmetry operation to the constraint formula of H.
As evident, E is a right diagonal negation rule with the constraint formula property.
Deﬁnition 7. Let G be a right diagonal negation rule of a sequent system V in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency.
Then the negation-dual rule L of G is a left diagonal negation rule so deﬁned:
(i) if G has not the constraint formula property, i.e. it has the form:
B, X  Y
X  Y ,¬B G
then L has the form:
Γ  , F
¬F ,Γ  L
(ii) if G has the constraint formula property, i.e. it has the form:
B, X  Y ,Ψ
X  Y ,Ψ,¬B G
where Ψ and B have the properties established by Deﬁnition 4, then:
(a) if Ψ is empty and B is the ﬁxed formula schema Θ then L has the form:
Γ  ,¬Θ
¬¬Θ,Γ  L
(b) if Ψ is not empty then L has the form:
¬Σ,Γ  , F
¬Σ,¬F ,Γ  L
where Σ is the formula schema included in the singleton Ψ .
Proposition 8. The negation-dual rules of the rules ¬ − L3, ¬ − L4, ¬ − L5 of the systems BC, CI, CIL are the following:
A,Ω  Π,¬◦A
Ω  Π,¬◦A,¬A¬ − R3,
¬◦A,Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬¬◦A¬ − R4,
¬(A ∧ ¬A),Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬¬(A ∧ ¬A)¬ − R5
Remark 2. If we use the black circle connective •(.) of Logic of Formal Inconsistency such that CI proves  ¬◦A ↔ •A (see
[9, p. 44]) the negation-dual rules of the left negation rules of CI acquire the following forms:
A,Ω  Π, •A
Ω  Π, •A,¬A¬ − R3,
•A,Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬•A¬ − R4
where the antisymmetric link is particularly clear.
Deﬁnition 8. Let U be a paraconsistent sequent system in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency, such that applying
to U the standard translation t with t(◦A) ≡ ¬(A ∧ ¬A) a formulation of a subsystem of classical logic LK is obtained, and
such that U has both left and right diagonal negation rules. Then the negation-dual system nd–U of U is [structural and
positive rules of LK] plus [negation-dual rules of the diagonal negation rules of U].
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relevance of diagonal negation rules as to the constructive behavior of a system, but also takes into account the hypothesis
that the standard translation of U must remain a subsystem of LK, so that the possible non-diagonal negation rules cannot
be too strange, i.e. cannot produce exceptionally relevant information: e.g., they cannot produce the negation inconsistency
of U.
We can give the ﬁrst formal condition for the deﬁnition of constructive paraconsistency:
Deﬁnition 9. Let U be a paraconsistent sequent system in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency, such that the
negation-dual system nd–U can be deﬁned. Then we say that U is pseudo-constructive if U has cut-elimination and nd–U is
pseudo-intuitionistic.
Then, in general, a bit of work is needed in order to establish the pseudo-constructivity of a system. It is easy to see
that the above mentioned system LDJ presented in [25] is pseudo-constructive. But the interesting point is to investigate
the constructivity of paraconsistent systems whose diagonal negation rules have the constraint formula property. As already
remarked, the constraint formula declaratively expresses the distance between the system U and classical logic LK, conveying
effective information. Therefore, the constraint formula property must mark a difference in the hierarchy of constructive
paraconsistency:
Deﬁnition 10. Let U be a pseudo-constructive paraconsistent system. Then, U is declaratively constructive if it has left diagonal
negation rules with the constraint formula property.
We concentrate on CI and we shall prove it is a declaratively constructive system.
Lemma 9. The negation-dual system nd–CI of CI is given by:
[structural and positive rules of LK] plus
A,Ω  Π,¬◦A
Ω  Π,¬◦A,¬A¬ − R3 plus
¬◦A,Ω  Π
Ω  Π,¬¬◦A¬ − R4 plus
X  Y , B
¬B, X  Y ¬ − L
Proposition 9. nd–CI admits cut-elimination.
Proof. The critical cases of cut-occurrences to be considered are that where the cut-formula is introduced by negation rules.
These cases are analogous to those already examined for the cut-elimination in BC and CI, where constrained negation rules
are involved. Then, we refer the reader to the proof of cut-elimination for BC and CI (Sections 3, 4, Theorems 1, 2). 
Proposition 10. nd–CI cannot prove inﬁnitely many instances of the excluded middle principle B∨¬B and of the left double negation
principle ¬¬B → B, so that it is a pseudo-intuitionistic system.
Proof. By cut-elimination, it is easy to see that sequents  p ∨ ¬p and ¬¬p  p, p propositional letter, cannot be nd–CI
provable. Analogously, it is straightforward to ﬁnd arbitrarily complex B ’s such that  B ∨ ¬B and ¬¬B  B cannot be
provable without cuts. 
Theorem 4. CI is a declaratively constructive paraconsistent system.
In order to establish a complete notion of constructivity for paraconsistent logic, we deem that a further condition on the
negation connective must be imposed. That is, we recall the well-known idea, which is seminal in constructive mathematics,
stating that the negation of A must express an unprovability condition of A. In the next sections we present an arithmetical
semantics for paraconsistent C-systems that can help us to formalize such negation as unprovability condition (NUC).
Deﬁnition 11. Let U be a paraconsistent sequent system in the language of Logic of Formal Inconsistency. An arithmetical
interpretation of the U-language is a triple 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 where N is the standard model of classical Arithmetic PA, and ϕ is an
application such that atomic propositional formulas pi, pr, . . . are sent into PA-formulas of the forms ConW j,¬ConWk, . . . ,
i.e. ∃xProvW j(x,#0 = 1), ¬∃xProvWk(x,#0 = 1), W j , Wk consistent axiomatizable extensions of PA, and for each compound
formula B , ϕ(B) is a formula of PA-Provability Logic. B is true in 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 if N | ϕ(B) in the standard sense. 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 is
an arithmetical model of U if N | ϕ(A) for each U-theorem A.
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arithmetical models. Arithmetical models provide a strong semantical tool in order to characterize the NUC-property:
Deﬁnition 12. Let U be a declaratively constructive paraconsistent system. Then U is canonically constructive if it has the fol-
lowing formal NUC-property: U admits an arithmetical model 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 such that for inﬁnitely many non-atomic formulas
B of U we have ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)).
Proposition 11. CI is a canonically constructive paraconsistent system.
Proof. See the construction of the arithmetical models of CI in Section 8. 
In a canonically constructive system, the formal NUC-property ensures that negation is completely controlled from a
constructive standpoint: in particular, also that weak negation properties introduced by possible non-diagonal negation rules
must fall under the action ﬁeld of the formal NUC-property. It can be interesting to remark that the pseudo-constructive
paraconsistent systems LDJ [25] and DI [1] are falsiﬁed by arithmetical models of BC, CI, CIL. For example, ¬((p → p) ∧
¬(p → p)) is an LDJ-theorem which is false in such models. This could support the conjecture that the constraint formula
property is a necessary condition for the formal NUC-property, but it is only a conjecture.
7. The meaning of the paraconsistent negation: arithmetical models
As already declared, we will focus on the arithmetical semantics of propositional connectives of LFIs. We recall the ba-
sic notions of Provability Logic that are employed in the sequel. We refer to [2,19,22] for a general presentation of such
ﬁeld, and to [15–18] for the proof-theoretic approach. As well known, for each recursively axiomatized system T (and
then for classical Arithmetic PA too) a binary primitive recursive predicate ProvT(.,.) can be deﬁned in Arithmetic PA,
such that ProvT(m,n) holds iff m is the Gödel-number of a T-proof of the sentence with Gödel-number n. The PA-formula
∃y ProvT(y,#B) means “the sentence B is T-provable” and we also write it as PrT(B). For brevity, we will omit the preﬁx #
in the terms of the form #B (i.e. the Gödel-number of B) occurring as arguments of the provability predicate PrT(.). The fol-
lowing sequents, that express properties of the provability predicate, are PA-provable: (D1) PrT(A → B)  PrT(A) → PrT(B);
(D2) PrT(A → B) ∧ PrT(A)  PrT(B); (D3)  PrT(A ∧ B) ↔ PrT(A) ∧ PrT(B); (D4) PrT(B)  PrT(PrT(B)). PA also proves the
following useful relation (D5):  PrT(¬PrT(B)) ↔ PrT (0 = 1), which is a speciﬁc relation of classical PA-based Provability
Logic, and that does not hold, in general, in Paraconsistent Provability Logic. As usual, in the classical setting, ¬PrT (0 = 1)
and PrT (0 = 1) are canonically employed to state, respectively, the consistency and the inconsistency of T, and are also
written as ConT, ¬ConT, assuming that T includes the arithmetical language. We also call ConT, ¬ConT global consistency
assertions, when we compare them with the local consistency assertions of the form ◦B . The relationships between global and
local consistency assertions are investigated by Paraconsistent Provability Logic based on LFIs’, which has been introduced
in [4,14].
The crucial points are the interpretations of the negation connective ¬ and of the local consistency connective ◦(.) as
intensional connectives. We have that, in general, ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)): that is, the paraconsistent negation of B has the
same meaning as 〈〈B is not provable in classical PA〉〉 and it is a Π1-complexity operator. The interpretation of ◦(.) is
linked to that of ¬, and, in general, ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B) ∧ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B))): that is, ϕ translates ◦(.) following the intended
meta-theoretical expression of ◦B as “〈〈B and not B〉〉 does not hold”, and moreover taking into account the mentioned
interpretation of ¬. As natural, B is true in 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 if N | ϕ(B) in the standard sense. However, we must underline that
arithmetical semantics, even if compositional, is not uniform w.r.t. the syntactical structure, since it is a complexity-sensitive
semantics. For example, in the general arithmetical interpretations (Deﬁnition 13) ϕ on circled propositional letters is ϕ(◦p j) ≡
¬ConPA, whereas ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B) ∧ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B))), which is PA-equivalent to ConPA, if B is not a positive classical
formula: that is, ϕ separates the meaning of ◦(.) applied on formulas that does not include the intensional connectives
¬, ◦(.), from the meaning of ◦(.) applied on formulas that include intensional connectives, i.e. the increasing of the wealth of
information conveyed by the syntax changes the meaning attribution.
Deﬁnition 13. Let PA∗ ≡ PA+ConPA,W1 ≡ PA∗+ConPA∗ , W2 ≡W1+ConW1, . . . . Then a general arithmetical interpretation of
the C-system language is a triple 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 where N is the standard model of classical Arithmetic PA, and ϕ is an injective
application from the set {p1, p2, . . .} of propositional letters into the set of sentences {¬ConW j,ConWk: k, j = 1,2, . . .}.
ϕ is so speciﬁed on non-atomic formulas:
1. As to positive classical connectives , ϕ behaves standardly, that is ϕ(AB) ≡ ϕ(A)ϕ(B) for any pair A, B of formulas.
2. As to the negation connective ¬ and the local consistency connective ◦(.) we distinguish several cases:
2.1. Elementary cases. Let F be a non-atomic positive classical formula and k 0:
ϕ(¬p j) ≡ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(p j)
)
, ϕ(¬F ) ≡ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(F )∧ ConPA)
ϕ
(◦p j
) ≡ ¬ConPA, ϕ(◦F ) ≡ ¬ConPA
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(¬2k+1(◦p j
)) ≡ Con PA, ϕ(¬2k+1(◦F )) ≡ ConPA
ϕ
(¬2k(◦p j
)) ≡ ¬ConPA, ϕ(¬2k(◦F )) ≡ ¬ConPA
2.2. Compound cases:
2.2.1. If B is not a positive classical formula and k 1 then:
ϕ
(◦B
) ≡ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
))
for each k 0, ϕ
(¬2k+1(◦B)) ≡ PrPA
(¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
for each k 1, ϕ
(¬2k(◦B)) ≡ ¬PrPA
(¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
2.2.2. If B is not a positive classical formula and B has not the forms ◦D , ¬2k+1(◦D), ¬2k(◦D) then:
ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if N  ϕ(B)
PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if N | ϕ(B) and PA  ϕ(B)
¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if PA  ϕ(B)
3. We say that formula B of the C-system language is true in 〈N,PA,ϕ〉, and that 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 is an arithmetical model of B ,
if N | ϕ(B).
Such deﬁnition formalizes the following seminal ideas:
(1) The paraconsistent negation ¬B has an intensional character and a constructive nature: this is expressed, in general, by
an interpretation of the form ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)). That is, the meaning is the negation of the provability of (the interpretation
of) B in classical Arithmetic. Therefore, the paraconsistent negation is interpreted as a Π1 operator. Of course, our
general principle must nevertheless take into account the different cases arising by the consideration of the N-truth
and the PA-provability of ϕ(B): this is the reason of the three sub-cases that deﬁnes ϕ(¬B) for a non-elementary B .
(2) The interpretation of the local consistency connective ◦(.) is such that, in general, ϕ(◦B) reﬂects both its meta-theoretical
intended meaning as “〈〈B and not B〉〉 does not hold” and the previously stated interpretation of the paraconsistent
negation. Thus, in the most general case, the local consistency assertion ◦B becomes a global consistency assertion on
PA, linked to the formula ϕ(B): indeed, each true sentence of the form ¬PrPA(G) also asserts the consistency of PA for
any G .
(3) The semantics must separate the role of formulas including the intensional connectives ¬ and ◦(.) from that of for-
mulas which do not include intensional connectives. This is the reason of the distinction between elementary and
compound cases, and leads to remarkable differences between the corresponding interpretations. For example ϕ(◦B) is
PA-equivalent to the consistency ConPA of PA for each non-elementary B , whereas ϕ(◦p j) is ¬ConPA. The underlying
idea is that formulas ◦F with F without occurrences of ¬ or ◦(.) cannot reliably express any true statement on the con-
sistency of a system, even in the limit case where the system is reduced to a formula. Similarly, if F is positive classical,
ϕ(¬F ) is always simpliﬁed to a global consistency statement of the form ¬PrPA(ϕ(F ) . . .): that is, it is assumed that
the information included in F does not suﬃce to separate the interpretation of the negation of F into different mean-
ings. Then, we can say that the qualitative complexity of the interpreted formula affects its meaning in the arithmetical
semantics.
If E is any expression of the C-system language we also write Eϕ for ϕ(E).
Proposition 12. Let 〈N,PA, ϕ〉 be any general arithmetical interpretation. Suppose that B is not positive classical and k 0. Then PA
proves:
(i) ϕ(◦B) ↔ ConPA;
(ii) ϕ(¬2k+1(◦B)) ↔ ¬ConPA;
(iii) ϕ(¬2k(◦B)) ↔ ConPA.
Proof. (i) ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B))) is:
¬(PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
which, by standard Provability Logic (D3), gives:
¬(PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)∧ PrPA
(¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
and then, by (D5)
¬(PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)∧ PrPA(0= 1)
)
from which, by (D3)
¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ 0= 1) that is ¬PrPA(0= 1), i.e. ConPA
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PrPA
(¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
that, by point (i), is PA-equivalent to PrPA(¬PrPA(0= 1)) which, by (D5), gives PrPA(0= 1) that is ¬ConPA.
(iii) ϕ(¬2k(◦B)) is by deﬁnition:
¬PrPA
(¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)∧ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)))
that, analogously to points (i) and (ii), gives ¬PrPA(0= 1). 
It is worth noting that the above stated equivalence does not hold in general in Paraconsistent Provability Logic based on
paraconsistent arithmetics PCA or PACI, that have been introduced in [4,14]. That is, from the standpoint of the object system,
which also could be paraconsistent Arithmetic PCA or PACI, interpreting ◦B through ¬PrPA(ϕ(B) ∧ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B))) is not the
same as interpreting ◦B through ConPA. Such identiﬁcation is only possible a posteriori in the classical setting.
We recall that PrPA(A) → A is the local reﬂection principle for PA (see [22, Section 4.1]). We write Rfn(Σ1) for the
restriction of the principle to Σ1-formulas, and note that PrPA(B) is a Σ1-formula.
Proposition 13. Let 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any general arithmetical interpretation and suppose that B is not positive classical. Then:
(j) If k 0, PA proves ϕ(¬2k+1(◦B)) ↔ PrPA(ϕ(¬2k(◦B)));
(jj) If k 1, the systemW≡ PA+ Rfn(Σ1) proves:
ϕ
(¬2k(◦B)) ←→ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ
(¬2k−1(◦B)))
Proof. (j) By Proposition 12, ϕ(¬2k(◦B)) is PA-equivalent to ConPA, i.e. to ¬PrPA(0= 1) for each k 0. Then,
PrPA
(
ϕ
(¬2k(◦B))) is PA-equivalent to:
PrPA
(¬PrPA(0= 1)
)
which, by (D5), is PA-equivalent to PrPA(0 = 1) which is ¬ConPA. By Proposition 12: ¬ConPA ↔ ϕ(¬2k+1(◦B)) for each
k 0, and we have the thesis.
(jj) By Proposition 12, for each k 1, ϕ(¬2k−1(◦B)) is PA-equivalent to ¬ConPA, so that
¬PrPA
(
ϕ
(¬2k−1(◦B))) is PA-equivalent to:
¬PrPA
(
PrPA(0= 1)
)
By (D4), which is PrPA(B) → PrPA(PrPA(B)), we have:
¬PrPA
(
PrPA(0= 1)
) → ¬PrPA(0= 1)
On the other hand, by Rfn(Σ1), which gives:
PrPA
(
PrPA(0= 1)
) → PrPA(0= 1), we have:
¬PrPA(0= 1) → ¬PrPA
(
PrPA(0= 1)
)
Thus, ¬PrPA(PrPA(0= 1)) is W-equivalent to ¬PrPA(0= 1), which is ConPA.
Then, by Proposition 12, it is W-equivalent to ϕ(¬2k(◦B)).
Observe that the implication:
¬PrPA
(
ϕ
(¬2k−1(◦B))) → ϕ(¬2k(◦B))
is PA-provable. 
We note that, by Proposition 13, for any B which is not positive classical, ϕ(¬2k(◦B)) is N-true and not PA-provable,
and ϕ(¬2k+1(◦B)) is N-false. If we moreover consider the equivalences stated by Proposition 12, we may assume that the
cases 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of Deﬁnition 13 can be uniﬁed, from the standpoint of classical Arithmetic providing the models,
without loosing the established essential meaning of ϕ(◦B) and ϕ(¬B):
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replacement of the clause 2.2 by the following:
Compound cases:
If B is not a positive classical formula then:
ϕ
(◦B
) ≡ ConPA
If B is not atomic and does not belong to the elementary cases (clause 2.1, Deﬁnition 1), then:
ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if N  ϕ(B)
PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if N | ϕ(B) and PA  ϕ(B)
¬PrPA
(
ϕ(B)
)
if PA  ϕ(B)
In the sequel we brieﬂy say general arithmetical interpretation for any interpretation ϕ deﬁned in Deﬁnition 14, since we
will always work with simpliﬁed interpretations.
In the next section we shall see that arithmetical models really are models for C-systems.
8. Arithmetical models for BC, CI, CIL and the semantical complexity gap between the paraconsistent negation ¬ and the
local consistency connective ◦(.)
In this section it will be proven that each system among BC, CI, CIL has a denumerable inﬁnity of arithmetical models.
However, while all general arithmetical interpretations (Deﬁnition 13) provide arithmetical models for the system given
by the positive rules plus the rule set {¬ − L1,¬ − L3,¬ − L4,¬ − L5,¬ − R}, that is for the system only expressing the
paraconsistent negation from BC to CIL, we have a partial break when the local consistency connective ◦(.) is considered:
indeed, general arithmetical interpretations can falsify the ◦(.)-introduction rule R Ci (Proposition 15). For example, consider
any R Ci-instance B∧¬B,Γ 
Γ ,◦B with B positive classical formula, and take the simplest case:
p j  p j
p j ∧ ¬p j  p j
 p j, ◦p j
where B is the letter p j . Then, if we choose ϕ(p j) ≡ ¬ConW j , by deﬁnition, we have ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬ConPA for each ϕ , which
is false, so that ( p j, ◦p j)ϕ is false in N. Through analogous considerations, we have the same conclusion for the R Ci-
instances where B in ◦B is an arbitrarily complex positive classical formula. To model the R Ci-rule too, we must restrict
the set of general arithmetical interpretations to the subset of positive arithmetical interpretations, such that ϕ(p j) has the
form ConWkj for each j, as Theorems 7 and 8 show. Thus, the set of interpretations which model the paraconsistent
negation is larger than that modeling the local consistency connective. That is, in the arithmetical semantics setting, in
general, the constraints on the truth of a CI-theorem including ◦(.) are stronger than the truth constraints of a CI-theorem
possibly including negation connectives but where ◦(.) does not occur. We deem that this condition allows to state that the
semantical complexity of ◦(.) is higher than the semantical complexity of ¬. As a corroboration, we note that, even if both
connectives are intensional, the intensionality of ¬ can be seen as simpler: in some cases the paraconsistent negation has a
completely classical behavior, as the rule ¬− R shows. Differently, ◦(.) is a purely intensional connective with a metalogical
content, since it expresses a consistency condition.
Furthermore, a development can be added to this picture: if in the R Ci-principal formula ◦B the sub-formula B is not
positive classical, then the R Ci-instance is veriﬁed under all the arithmetical interpretations. Indeed the system CIL∗ ≡
BC+¬− L4+¬− L5+ R Ci∗ , where R Ci∗ is the restriction of R Ci mentioned above, has a model 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 for each general
arithmetical interpretation ϕ (Theorem 6). A heuristic explanation could be the following. We have already observed that
arithmetical semantics is an information-sensitive semantics, i.e. it takes into account the quality of the information included
in the interpreted formulas; therefore, in some sense, it selects as problematical those rules introducing formulas ◦B where
no negation connectives occur in B, in this way emphasizing the evident but deep fact that consistency statements, even if
minimal and local, cannot be established without using negation.
We recall that a PA-sequent W  Z is N-true if and only if either at least one formula of Z is N-true or at least one
formula of W is N-false. If P is a proof-tree in the C-system language we write Pϕ for the tree obtained by replacing each
sequent X  Y of P by (X  Y )ϕ . Given any sequent Γ  , we write ∧Γ for the conjunction of the formulas of Γ , and ∨
for the disjunction of the formulas of .
Proposition 14. Let G be any classical logical rule introducing a positive connective. Then G is sound w.r.t. each general arithmetical
interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
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a ∨ − R rule occurrence in a BC-proof P : Γ ,A
Γ ,B∨A . Assuming that Γ
ϕ  ϕ, Aϕ is N-true, Γ ϕ  ϕ, Bϕ ∨ Aϕ must be
N-true. 
Deﬁnition 15. Let R be any logical rule of a system V ∈ {BC,CI,CIL,LK,LJ}. Then, a proof with a minimal length for R in V is
any cut-free V-proof Q such that: Q has R as end-rule, each auxiliary formula of the end-rule is the successor of an axiom
formula, and no shorter proof M exists whose end-sequent is a sub-sequent of the Q -root.4
Lemma 10. Let R be an element of the set {¬ − L1,¬ − L3,¬ − L4,¬ − L5,¬ − R} and let Q be any proof with a minimal
length (Deﬁnition 15) for R in the system BC+ ¬ − L4+ ¬ − L5. Then the end-sequent of Q ϕ is true for each general arithmetical
interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
Proof. For each rule we proceed by induction on the complexity of the auxiliary formula, as it is described by Deﬁnition 14.
1. ¬ − L1: the proofs Q of minimal length have the form: AA¬¬AA .
1.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula A:
1.1.1. Let A ∈ {p, F }, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula. Observe that ¬¬F is not
elementary in the taxonomy established by Deﬁnitions 13 and 14. We note that ϕ(¬A) ≡ ¬PrPA(E) with E
not PA-provable, which is N-true and not PA-provable for each ϕ . Then ϕ(¬¬A) ≡ PrPA(¬PrPA(ϕ(A))) which
is N-false, and the conclusion of Q ϕ is true for each ϕ .
1.1.2. Let A ∈ {¬p,¬F }, p and F as above. ϕ(A) ≡ ¬PrPA(E) with E not PA-provable, which is N-true and not
PA-provable for each ϕ . Then (¬¬A  A)ϕ is true for each ϕ .
1.1.3. Let A ∈ {◦p, ◦F }, p and F as above. By Deﬁnitions 13 and 14, ϕ(¬¬A) ≡ ¬ConPA for each ϕ , which is N-false.
Then the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
1.1.4. Let A ∈ {¬h(◦p),¬h(◦F )}, p and F as above, h  1. By construction ϕ(¬h+2(◦p)) ≡ ϕ(¬h(◦p)),ϕ(¬h+2(◦F )) ≡
ϕ(¬h(◦F )) and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
1.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula A: suppose that ϕ(A) is N-true; then the conclusion is true. Suppose
that ϕ(A) is N-false; then, by deﬁnition of ϕ on compound cases, ϕ(¬A) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(A)) which is true and not
PA-provable, and then ϕ(¬¬A) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(¬A)) which is false, and the conclusion is true. Thus, the conclusion of
Q ϕ is true for each ϕ .
2. ¬ − L3: the proofs Q of minimal length have the form:
AA◦ A,AA◦ A,¬A,A . We preliminarily establish that the ¬ − L3 instances
with auxiliary formula of the form ◦B are considered as ¬ − L4 instances (see point 3).
2.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula A:
2.1.1. Let A ∈ {p, F }, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula. Then ϕ(◦A) ≡ ¬ConPA
for each ϕ , which is N-false. Then (◦A,¬A, A )ϕ is true for each ϕ .
2.1.2. Let A ∈ {¬p,¬F }, p and F as above. We have ϕ(A) ≡ ¬PrPA(E) with E not PA-provable, so that ϕ(A) is true
and not PA-provable. Then ϕ(¬A) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(A)) which is false and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
2.1.3. Let A ∈ {¬2k+1(◦p),¬2k(◦p),¬2k+1(◦F ),¬2k(◦F )}, p and F as above, k 0. By construction, in the antecedent
of (◦A,¬A, A )ϕ a formula of the form ¬ConPA always occurs, so that the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
2.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula A: suppose that ϕ(A) is false; then (◦A,¬A, A )ϕ is true. Suppose that
ϕ(A) is true and not PA-provable; then ϕ(¬A) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(A)) which is false, and the conclusion is true. Suppose
that ϕ(A) is true and PA-provable; then ϕ(¬A) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(A)) which is false, and the conclusion is true. Thus, the
conclusion of Q ϕ is true for each ϕ .
3. ¬ − L4: the proofs Q of minimal length have the form: ◦ A◦ A¬◦ A,◦ A .
3.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula ◦A:
3.1.1. Let ◦A ∈ {◦p, ◦F }, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula. Then ϕ(◦A) ≡
¬ConPA for each ϕ , which is N-false. Then (¬◦A,◦ A )ϕ is true for each ϕ .
3.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula ◦A: by Deﬁnition 14, ϕ(◦A) ≡ ConPA which is true and not PA-provable,
so that ϕ(¬◦A) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(◦A)) which is false, and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
4. ¬ − L5: the proofs Q of minimal length have the following possible forms:
A  A ¬A  ¬A
A,¬A  A ∧ ¬A
¬(A ∧ ¬A), A,¬A  ,
A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ ¬A
¬(A ∧ ¬A), A ∧ ¬A 
since, for each ϕ , (¬(A ∧ ¬A), A,¬A )ϕ is true if and only if (¬(A ∧ ¬A), A ∧ ¬A )ϕ is true, we examine the ﬁrst
case only.
4 Observe that, by alternating redundant weakenings and contractions, one can produce arbitrarily long cut-free proofs with the same axioms and the
same conclusion.
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4.1.1. Let A ∈ {p, F }, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula. Suppose that ϕ(A)
is false; then (¬(A ∧ ¬A),¬A, A )ϕ is true. Suppose that ϕ(A) is true; since by deﬁnition ϕ(¬A) is true
and not PA-provable, ϕ(A ∧ ¬A) ≡ ϕ(A) ∧ ϕ(¬A) is true too and not PA-provable; thus ϕ(¬(A ∧ ¬A)) ≡
PrPA(ϕ(A ∧ ¬A)) which is false, and the conclusion is true. Then, the conclusion of Q ϕ is true for each ϕ .
4.1.2. Let A ∈ {¬p,¬F }, p and F as above. We conclude as in 2.1.2.
4.1.3. Let A ∈ {¬2k+1(◦p),¬2k(◦p),¬2k+1(◦F ),¬2k(◦F )}, p and F as above, k 0. We conclude as in 2.1.3.
4.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula A: we conclude as in 2.2.
5. ¬ − R: the proofs Q of minimal length have the form: AAA,¬A .
5.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula A:
5.1.1. Let A ∈ {p, F ,¬p,¬F , ◦p, ◦F ,¬2k+1(◦p),¬2k(◦p),¬2k+1(◦F ),¬2k(◦F )}, p propositional letter and F any non-
atomic positive classical formula. In these cases either ϕ(A) or ϕ(¬A) is true for each ϕ and the conclusion
is true for each ϕ .
5.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula A: If ϕ(A) is true the conclusion is true. If ϕ(A) is false then ϕ(¬A) ≡
¬PrPA(ϕ(A)) which is true, and the conclusion is true. Thus, the conclusion of Q ϕ is true for each ϕ . 
In the proof of the next Theorem 5, we often employ the fact that if F is a positive classical formula then a sub-class Φ
of the class of general interpretations exists, such that F is true for each ϕ ∈ Φ . Such point will be clariﬁed by Lemma 11.
Theorem 5. Let X  Y be the root of a cut-free proof P in the system BC+ ¬ − L4+ ¬ − L5 and 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 any general arithmetical
interpretation. Then (X  Y )ϕ is true.
Proof. We proceed by a main induction on the length of P , with a sub-induction on the complexity of the auxiliary formulas
of the rule occurrences in P , following the taxonomy given in Deﬁnition 14. The relevant rules are ¬− L1,¬− L3,¬− L4,¬−
L5,¬ − R; the remaining cases are straightforward, see Proposition 14.
Basis of the main induction: it is given by Lemma 10.
Step of the main induction: for each relevant rule occurrence R in P , which is not the end-rule of a P sub-proof of minimal
length for R, we assume that the premise is true for each ϕ and prove that the conclusion is true for each ϕ . In general,
the premise of R has the form
{possible constraint or auxiliary formulas}, Γ  , {possible auxiliary formula}
and we will examine only the non-trivial cases for the thesis, that is: (∧Γ ϕ true and ∨ϕ false) or (Γ ϕ empty and ∨ϕ
false) or (∧Γ ϕ true and ϕ empty) or (Γ ϕ empty and ϕ empty); in the remaining cases the truth of the conclusion does
not depend on R.
1. Let R be a ¬ − L1 occurrence in P : B,Γ ¬¬B,Γ . The induction hypothesis states that Bϕ , Γ ϕ  ϕ is N-true for each ϕ .
Then, in the non-trivial cases, Bϕ is false for each ϕ .
1.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: if Bϕ is false for each ϕ , then B ∈ {◦p, ◦F ,
¬2k(◦p),¬2k(◦F )}, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula, k  1. Thus ¬¬B ∈
{¬2h+2(◦p),¬2h+2(◦F )}, h 0, and ϕ(¬¬B) ≡ ¬ConPA for each ϕ , which is false and the thesis holds.
1.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: if Bϕ is false for each ϕ , then ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)) which is
true and not PA-provable, and then ϕ(¬¬B) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(¬B)) which is false, and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
2. Let R be a ¬ − L3 occurrence in P : ◦B,Γ ,B◦B,¬B,Γ  . Recall that the ¬ − L3 instances with auxiliary formula of the form ◦G
are considered as ¬ − L4 instances. The induction hypothesis states that (◦B,Γ  , B)ϕ is N-true for each ϕ .
2.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: B is compatible with the induction hypothesis if
B ∈ {p, F ,¬p,¬F ,¬2k+1(◦p),¬2k+1(◦F )}, p propositional letter and F any non-atomic positive classical formula,
k  0. In these cases for each ϕ either ϕ(◦B) is false or ϕ(B) is true. If ϕ(◦B) is false, the conclusion too is true.
The cases where, for each ϕ , ϕ(◦B) is true and ϕ(B) is true, are given by B ∈ {¬p,¬F ,¬2k+1(◦p),¬2k+1(◦F )}. It
is easy to see, either by deﬁnition or by the examination of the formulas ϕ(¬¬A) already produced at point 1 of
Lemma 10, that ϕ(¬B) results as false for each ϕ , and the thesis holds.
2.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: ϕ(◦B) ≡ ConPA for each ϕ , then the induction hypothesis forces,
in the non-trivial cases, Bϕ true for each ϕ . Then we conclude as in point 2.2 of the proof of Lemma 10.
3. Let R be a ¬ − L4 occurrence in P : Γ ,◦B¬◦B,Γ  . The induction hypothesis states that (Γ  , ◦B)ϕ is N-true for each ϕ .
Then, in the non-trivial cases, ϕ(◦B) must be true for each ϕ .
3.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula ◦B of R: in such cases ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬ConPA for each ϕ , which
is false, so that they are not compatible with the induction hypothesis.
3.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula ◦B of R: in such cases ϕ(◦B) ≡ ConPA for each ϕ , which is true and not
PA-provable, so that ϕ(¬◦B) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(◦B)) which is false, and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
4. Let R be a ¬ − L5 occurrence in P : Γ ,B∧¬B¬(B∧¬B),Γ  . The induction hypothesis states that (Γ  , B ∧ ¬B)ϕ is N-true for
each ϕ , and in the non-trivial cases this is the same as requiring that ϕ(B∧¬B) is true for each ϕ , that is ϕ(B) true for
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which is false, and the conclusion is true; if ϕ(B ∧ ¬B) is true and not PA-provable, then ϕ(¬(B ∧ ¬B)) ≡ PrPA(ϕ(B ∧
¬B)) which is false, and the conclusion is true. Then, the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
5. Let R be a ¬ − R occurrence in P : B,Γ 
Γ ,¬B . The induction hypothesis states that (B,Γ  )ϕ is N-true for each ϕ .
Then, in the non-trivial cases, ϕ(B) must be false for each ϕ .
5.1. Atomic and elementary cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: if Bϕ is false for each ϕ , then B ∈ {◦p, ◦F ,¬2k(◦p),
¬2k(◦F )}, p propositional letter and F any positive classical formula, k 1. By deﬁnition, ϕ(¬B) is true for each ϕ ,
and the conclusion is true for each ϕ .
5.2. Compound cases of the auxiliary formula B of R: if Bϕ is false for each ϕ , then ϕ(¬B) ≡ ¬PrPA(ϕ(B)) is true and
the conclusion is true for each ϕ . 
Corollary 2. Each general arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 is a model of BC. In particular, ◦A → ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is true in each
〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
Corollary 3. Each instance of the excluded middle principle A ∨ ¬A, i.e. each sequent of the form  A,¬A, is true in each general
arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
Proof. See point 5 of the proof of Lemma 10. 
Proposition 15. Let P be any proof of minimal length with an R Ci-instance as end-rule, such that the auxiliary formula B ∧ ¬B is
not introduced by axiom and the sub-formula B is positive classical. Then the end-sequent of P can be falsiﬁed by suitable general
arithmetical interpretations.
Proof. Consider the following CI-proof P :
BB
B∧¬BBB,◦B where B is any positive classical formula such that ϕ(B) is false for
some general arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA, ϕ〉. There are inﬁnitely many B with such property: for example take as
B any letter p j and choose ϕ(p j) ≡ ¬ConW j . By deﬁnition, we have ϕ(◦B) ≡ ¬ConPA for each ϕ , which is false, so that
( B, ◦B)ϕ is false. 
Corollary 4. The proper Ci-axiom ¬◦A → A ∧ ¬A is falsiﬁed by suitable general arithmetical interpretations.
Proof. Take the letter p for A and use the ϕ mentioned in the proof of Proposition 15. 
Corollary 5. The proper Cil-axiom ¬(A ∧ ¬A) → ◦A is falsiﬁed by suitable general arithmetical interpretations.
Proof. Take the letter p for A and use the ϕ mentioned in the proof of Proposition 15. 
Theorem 6. Let X  Y be the root of a cut-free proof P in the system CIL∗ ≡ BC + ¬ − L4 + ¬ − L5 + R Ci∗ , where R Ci∗ is the
restriction of R Ci to auxiliary formulas B ∧¬B such that B is not positive classical. Then (X  Y )ϕ is true for each general arithmetical
interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
Proof. We add to the proof of Theorem 5 the following remark. Consider any R Ci-instance in a proof P : A∧¬A,Γ 
Γ ,◦ A . If A is
not positive classical, then ϕ(◦A) ≡ ConPA for each ϕ and (Γ  , ◦A)ϕ is true for each ϕ . 
Corollary 6. Each general arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 is a model of CIL∗ .
Deﬁnition 16. A positive arithmetical interpretation of the C-system language is a general arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉
such that ϕ(p j) has the form ConWkj for each j.
Lemma 11. Let 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be a positive arithmetical interpretation and F a positive classical formula. Then ϕ(F ) is true.
Proof. The thesis is obvious, with the following remark: the a priori assumption of the consistency of each Wk , imposes the
truth in N of any sentence of the form ConWi → ConWh , by properties of classical implication in Tarskian semantics, even
if Wi is a proper subsystem of Wh . 
Theorem 7. Let X  Y be the root of a CI-proof P , and let 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any positive arithmetical interpretation. Then (X  Y )ϕ is
true.
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of the rule occurrences in P , following the taxonomy given in Deﬁnition 14.
Basis of the main induction: we add to the proof of the induction basis for Theorem 5 the case of the rule R Ci. The proofs
Q with a minimal length for R Ci (Deﬁnition 15) may have the following forms:
A  A
A ∧ ¬A  A
 A, ◦A ,
¬A  ¬A
A ∧ ¬A  ¬A
 ¬A, ◦A ,
A ∧ ¬A  A ∧ ¬A
 A ∧ ¬A, ◦A
If A is not positive classical then ϕ(◦A) ≡ ConPA for each ϕ and the conclusions are true for each ϕ .
Let A ∈ {p, F }, p propositional letter, F any non-atomic positive classical formula. In these cases both ϕ(A) and ϕ(¬A)
are true for each positive ϕ , and the conclusions are true for each positive ϕ .
Step of the main induction: for each rule occurrence R in P , which is not the end-rule of a P sub-proof of minimal length
for R, we assume that the premise is true for each positive ϕ and prove that the conclusion is true for each positive ϕ .
We only have to add to the proof of the induction step for Theorem 5 the R Ci case. In fact, it is possible to verify that
each item of such proof can be performed analogously, by restricting the induction hypothesis to the truth of the premise
for each positive ϕ , and the thesis to the truth of the conclusion for each positive ϕ . Therefore, let G be any R Ci-rule
occurrence in P : B∧¬B,Γ 
Γ ,◦B . We have to consider only the case with B positive classical. The induction hypothesis states
that (B ∧ ¬B,Γ  )ϕ is N-true for each positive ϕ . Then, in the non-trivial cases, ϕ(B ∧ ¬B) must be false for each
positive ϕ . But if B is positive classical and ϕ positive, ϕ(B ∧ ¬B) is true, and these cases are not compatible with the
induction hypothesis. 
Corollary 7. Each positive arithmetical interpretation is a model of CI.
Theorem 8. Let X  Y be the root of a CIL-proof P , and let 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any positive arithmetical interpretation. Then (X  Y )ϕ is
true.
Proof. The proof is obtained by assembling the proofs of Theorems 5 and 7. 
Corollary 8. Each positive arithmetical interpretation is a model of CIL.
Corollary 9. Let U ∈ {BC,CIL∗,CI,CIL} and let M ≡ 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any arithmetical model of U. Then each bottom particle D of U is
false inM.
Proof. A U-bottom particle (Section 2) is a formula D such that the sequent D  is U-provable. By hypothesis (D )ϕ is
true in M and then ϕ(D) must be false. 
A proper completeness result w.r.t. arithmetical models for a suitable CI-extension is in progress. To this end, the pre-
sented interpretations must be further reﬁned. For example, we will introduce models 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 such that ϕ(◦G) is false
for some classes of non-elementary complex formulas G .
9. Metalogical completeness: falsifying classical logic and intuitionistic logic
We have a kind of metalogical completeness property of an important sub-class of paraconsistent Logics of Formal In-
consistency w.r.t. arithmetical models 〈N,PA,ϕ〉: indeed, arithmetical models verify BC, CI, CIL but falsify classical logic LK and
intuitionistic logic LJ. If we observe that arithmetical models seem a constructive environment in the standard sense, since
they essentially are the provability logic of PA,5 this is a remarkably paradoxical result, from which important considerations
could arise on the role of Logics of Formal Inconsistency in constructive mathematics.
Proposition 16. Let F be any arbitrarily complex positive classical formula, and let M ≡ 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any positive arithmetical
interpretation. Then the classical contradiction F ∧ ¬F is true inM.
Proof. By Lemma 11 if ϕ is positive classical then ϕ(F ) is true. Moreover, by Deﬁnition 14, ϕ(¬F ) is in either ¬PrPA(ϕ(p))
if F is the atom p, or ¬PrPA(ϕ(F )∧ ConPA) in the most general case. Both formulas are true, and the thesis holds. 
Proposition 17. Let F be any arbitrarily complex positive classical formula. Then the instance ¬(F ∧ ¬F ) of the classical non-
contradiction principle is false in each positive arithmetical interpretationM≡ 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
5 A notable simple fact is that classical Provability Logic substantially rejects the excluded middle principle, in the following sense: PrT(A)∨ PrT(¬A) does
not hold in general, even if PrT(A ∨ ¬A) trivially holds.
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PrPA(ϕ(F ∧ ¬F )) which is false. 
Proposition 18. Let F be any arbitrarily complex positive classical formula, such that a non-positive arithmetical interpretation H ≡
〈N,PA,ψ〉 exists with ψ(F ) true inH. Then the classical contradiction F ∧ ¬F is true inH.
Proof. Take as F any arbitrarily complex positive classical tautology. Then ψ(F ) is necessarily true, and the proof is the
same as that of Proposition 16. 
Even if it could seem obvious, an important remark is the following: arithmetical interpretations make true only a speciﬁc
proper sub-class of the contradictions of the language, and inﬁnitely many contradictions, both classical and non-classical,
result as false. For example ϕ(¬F ∧ ¬¬F ), ϕ(◦F ∧ ¬◦F ) are false for any F in each arithmetical model.
Proposition 19. Let F be any arbitrarily complex positive classical formula, such that a non-positive arithmetical interpretation H ≡
〈N,PA,ψ〉 exists with ψ(F ) true inH. Then the instance ¬(F ∧ ¬F ) of the classical non-contradiction principle is false inH.
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 17. 
The propositions above allow to state the following theorem:
Theorem 9. Inﬁnitely many arithmetical interpretations exist, both positive and non-positive, that falsify inﬁnitely many instances of
the non-contradiction principle ¬(A ∧ ¬A) of classical logic LK. Moreover, the falsiﬁed instances may have arbitrarily high grade and
include all classical connectives.
Corollary 10. Each fragment U of classical logic LK including the non-contradiction principle ¬(A ∧ ¬A) is falsiﬁed by suitable
arithmetical interpretations, both positive and non-positive.
Now we show that the classical and intuitionistic theorem B → ¬¬B , i.e. the right double negation principle, is in general
falsiﬁed by arithmetical interpretations.
Proposition 20. Let F be any positive classical formula and let K ≡ 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 be any positive arithmetical model. Then the instance
F → ¬¬F of the right double negation principle is false inK.
Proof. By Lemma 11 if ϕ is positive classical then ϕ(F ) is true. By deﬁnition of arithmetical interpretation on positive
classical formulas ϕ(¬F ) is in either ¬PrPA(ϕ(p)), if F is the atom p, or ¬PrPA(ϕ(F ) ∧ ConPA) in the most general case.
Both formulas are true and not PA-provable. Thus ϕ(¬(¬F )) is PrPA(ϕ(¬F )) which is false. 
Proposition 21. Let F be any arbitrarily complex positive classical formula, such that a non-positive arithmetical interpretation H ≡
〈N,PA,ψ〉 exists with ψ(F ) true inH. Then the instance F → ¬¬F of the right double negation principle is false inH.
Proof. Take as F any positive classical tautology. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 20. 
Theorem 10. Each fragment V of intuitionistic logic LJ including the right double negation principle A → ¬¬A, and possibly excluding
each instance of the non-contradiction principle ¬(A∧¬A), is falsiﬁed by suitable arithmetical interpretations, both positive and non-
positive. Moreover, the falsiﬁed proper V-theorems may have arbitrarily high grade and include all classical connectives.
Finally, it is important to show directly that both classical negation rule on the left ¬ − L2 and classical contraposition
principle are falsiﬁed by arithmetical interpretations.
Proposition 22. Let Γ ,F¬F ,Γ any instance of the classical rule ¬ − L2, such that F is a positive classical formula. Suppose that for
each positive arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉, in the non-trivial cases where (Γ  )ϕ is false, (Γ  , F )ϕ is true. Then, the
sequent (¬F ,Γ  )ϕ is false.
Proof. By deﬁnition ϕ(¬F ) is ¬PrPA(ϕ(p)), if F is the atom p, or ¬PrPA(ϕ(F ) ∧ ConPA) in the most general case, which
are true. Then we have the thesis, since, by assumptions, ϕ is false or empty, and Γ ϕ is true or empty. 
Proposition 23. Assume that F , G are positive classical formulas. Then the contraposition principle instance (¬F → G) → (¬G →
¬¬F ) is false in each positive arithmetical interpretation 〈N,PA,ϕ〉.
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false. 
10. Possible developments of paraconsistent proof theory
The proof-theoretic analysis of BC, CI,CIL presented in Sections 2–6, besides producing some essential tools for the
arithmetical semantics, also indicates some possible developments in the investigation, through a purely syntactic approach, of
proof theory and Provability Logic of paraconsistent Arithmetic.
10.1. C-system-based Arithmetic and the fundamental conjecture
In [4] and in [14] the Primitive Recursive Arithmetics PCA end PRACI, respectively based on BC and CI, have been
introduced, and their peculiar paraconsistent Provability Logic has been explored. We deem that the CI-based full Arithmetic
PACI6 could be the main system that allows to introduce a new kind of constructive mathematics. We recall that, for each
recursively axiomatized system T, a T-provability predicate PrT(.) can be deﬁned in PCA and PRACI, such that PrT(#B)
means “the sentence B is T-provable”, where #B is the Gödel-number of B . Indeed, the point is that some interesting
relations can be discovered in PRACI and PACI between local consistency assertions of the form ◦B and global consistency
statements (or global non-triviality statements) of the form ¬PrT(#B). In [14] we have shown that:
 PrCI
(
#◦B
) → ¬PrCI(#B)
is PRACI-provable for a suitable class of sentences B ’s which have not the form ◦F . We call PrT(#◦B) → ¬PrT(#B) the
fundamental relation between local and global consistency for any CI-based system T. The preliminary results obtained in [4]
and in [14] allow to formulate the following fundamental conjecture:
Conjecture 1. It is possible to ﬁnd a weak PACI-extension W such that, for a suitable set of sentences B, the fundamental relation for
PACI, i.e. the sequent PrPACI(#◦B)  ¬PrPACI(#B), isW-provable.
Thus, the problem of proving the non-triviality of PACI (i.e. a global self-reference statement) could be reduced to the
provability of suitable local consistency assertions – that is, PACI almost would establish its own non-triviality. In essence,
the conjecture is the following: the paraconsistent arithmetical systems based on Logics of Formal Inconsistency have, w.r.t.
non-triviality, more constructive and eﬃcient proof capabilities than that owned by classical arithmetical systems w.r.t.
consistency. If the fundamental conjecture is true we could declare a kind of weakened Hilbert program for paraconsistent
Arithmetic. The substance of the fundamental conjecture was pointed out by Professor Carnielli in 2005.
10.2. Suggestions for a renewed Hilbert program, from Relevant Arithmetic to LFI-based Arithmetic
Let us discuss what a renewed Hilbert program for paraconsistent Arithmetic can be today. First, if the possibility of a
weakened Hilbert program is mentioned, a comparison is necessary with the perspective indicated by Meyer and Mortensen
in [20], and also repeated in the Mortensen’s book [21], concerning the same topic. In [20] it is shown that paraconsistent
Relevant Arithmetic R is absolutely consistent, i.e. non-trivial, through a model theoretic argument employing a model with
a ﬁnite domain. Thus, the authors say that the absolute consistency of R is proven by ﬁnitistic methods: “[. . . ] this argument
relies only on methods which are ﬁnitistic [. . . ]” [21, p. 18] and, moreover, “[. . . ] this goes some way to resurrecting the program
of Hilbert of a ﬁnitistic demonstration of the (absolute) consistency of mathematics” [20, p. 919]. We think that such result is
very relevant, and represents a substantial step in the development of paraconsistent mathematics. However, in order to
better understand it, it should be more clearly explained what is meant for “ﬁnitistic methods” and in particular what is the
ﬁnitistic character of the mentioned demonstration. Anyway, we note that the result is obtained using induction, since, in
general, to establish that any structure is a model for a formal system with inﬁnite theorems, some induction rule or axiom
is necessary (if we read the proof in [21, p. 18] the use of induction is implicit but evident). Moreover, it is also evident
that the metalogic employed to demonstrate the properties of R and of relevant logic RQ is classical logic; in particular, so
it must be the metalogic providing semantics, i.e. that deﬁning the model theory for R. Thus, we interpret ﬁnitistic methods
accepting some weak instances of induction rule as arguments provable in classical Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PRA. Then, if we
accept the result in its strongest form, we can suppose that it can be essentially expressed as:
PRA  Non-Triv(R)
where Non-Triv(R) is the PRA-formula stating the absolute consistency of R. That is, we suppose that the weakest induction
rule, allowing only atomic induction formulas, is needed (even if, as well known, PRA proves induction on Boolean com-
binations of Σ1-formulas). Then, an interesting aspect is that classical Arithmetic with the weakest induction rule proves
6 We recall that: PCA and PRACI have induction rule on ω with atomic induction formulas, PACI is PRACI extended by induction rule on ω with
arbitrarily complex induction formulas.
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allowing arbitrarily complex induction formulas. Obviously, it must be remarked that the implication of R is the relevant
and not the classical one, and that the positive propositional logic of R is a proper fragment of classical positive propo-
sitional logic. Finally, it is useful to recall that R is negation consistent too, but for R absolute consistency and negation
consistency are separate notions (see e.g. [21, p. 19]), and the discussed result does not mention the negation consistency
of R. A further interesting aspect of the Meyer–Mortensen work is that R can be extended to an axiomatizable (see [20,
p. 920]) negation inconsistent system RM32 having a ﬁnite model. We remark that being RM32 axiomatizable, a provability
predicate PrRM32(.) can be deﬁned, so that RM32-provability can be formalized in PRA. Thus, a fascinating suggestion arises:
adding negation inconsistency in a system that remains non-trivial, could reduce the complexity of induction rules required
for proving the absolute consistency.
Our proposal of a weakened Hilbert program starting from the properties of LFI-based arithmetical systems, considers a
different perspective. We are looking both for a non-triviality proof and for a negation consistency proof of full PACI, that could be
said constructive but not ﬁnitistic, in the following sense: the full PACI induction on ω can be used, but transﬁnite induction
on ordinals up to ε0 is replaced by ﬁnitistic statements given by ﬁnite propositional combinations H(◦B1, ◦B2, . . . , ◦Bn) of
local consistency assertions (such that ◦B j is not a PACI bottom particle or theorem and H is not a PACI bottom particle).
Indeed, as well known, in principle, a (syntactic) consistency proof of Arithmetic with full induction requires transﬁnite
induction on ordinals greater than ω, up to ε0 (see, e.g., [23]). Thus, we properly speak of a weakened Hilbert program,
since full induction on ω cannot be said ﬁnitistic in the traditional sense. However, it must be remarked that we wish to
use proof-theoretic arguments only, and that a real renewal of Hilbert program cannot omit negation consistency. Then, the
key point of the research is to explore if [PACI induction on ω] plus [assumptions of the form H(◦B1, ◦B2, . . . , ◦Bn)] can
replace transﬁnite induction up to ε0. The idea is that local consistency assertions are a kind of formalized meta-theory,
only requiring propositional language, perhaps the weakest formalized meta-theory which is possible, that can however
include powerful inference.
The proof of the fundamental conjecture would provide a technical corroboration of the above sketched design.
11. Work in progress: interpreting paraconsistent Arithmetic into classical Provability Logic
We have already introduced arithmetical systems based on Logics of Formal Inconsistency LFIs’: in [4] the BC-based
paraconsistent Primitive Recursive Arithmetic PCA and in [14] the CI-based Arithmetics PRACI and PACI. We will focus on
the full PACI, that we deem the most expressive among the C-system-based arithmetical systems. Then, in addition to the
possible proof-theoretic developments mentioned in Section 10, a parallel work in progress is the deﬁnition of arithmetical
models 〈N,PA,ϕ〉 for PACI, by extending the already deﬁned CI-models. Thus, also the arithmetical interpretations of the full
predicative case of CI will be presented. Various new problems must be faced: for example the interpretation of ◦(.) will be
similar but not identical to that presented in Section 7. We cannot explain here the new devices that the interpretation of
PACI into Provability Logic of PA needs, since a whole new article is necessary. However, some perspectives that the new
semantical tools make possible can be sketched.
11.1. Future works: breaking classical equivalences between some classes of reﬂection principles and consistency
The results already obtained in [4] and [14] show that for Arithmetic PRACI having only atomic induction rule, or for
some weak extensions admitting only induction formulas with a low complexity (∃xA or ∀xB with A, B atomic, and so
on), a kind of bounded cut-elimination property can be established, so that some relevant meta-mathematical properties
can be obtained by syntactic tools. For example in [4] it is shown, through syntactic arguments, that classical Diagonal
Lemma does not hold in general for PRACI and that Gödel theorems for PRACI must have a deeply different proof w.r.t.
the classical case. However, in order to investigate the relevant speciﬁc meta-mathematical features that full PACI has w.r.t.
classical Arithmetic PA, the effectively available syntactic means do not suﬃce. Thus, semantical tools provided by arithmetical
interpretations can play a substantial role. In the next work we will develop the following claim:
By arithmetical semantics for PACI, it can be proven that to the classical equivalences between Π1-restricted reﬂection principles
and consistency, and between Σ1-restricted reﬂection principles and Σ0-ω-consistency, do not correspond analogous equivalences
in the PACI-setting.
This could be an important topic. We deem that the well-known equivalence between reﬂection principles and con-
sistency is not intuitive, and strictly depends on the employed classical logic: it is not a real mathematical property of
arithmetical theories. Thus, as to LFI-based arithmetical systems, suitable instances of reﬂection principle could become a
tool for consistency proofs. This point too marks the constructive character of PACI w.r.t. PA.
More technically, we recall that (see [22, pp. 844–848]) the Uniform Reﬂection Principle for an axiomatizable system T
is RFN(T) ≡ ∀x(PrT[B(x)] → B(x))7 where B has only x free, and the Local Reﬂection Principle for T is Rfn(T) ≡ PrT(B) → B ,
7 As usual, to indicate the provability predicate that preserves the free variables of the possible open formulas at the argument, square brackets are
employed, so that PrT[B(x, y, z, . . .)] is a formula preserving the free variables x, y, z, . . . .
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over PRA (and then over PA): ¬PrT(0 = 1), RfnΠ1(T), RFNΠ1(T), where the principles are restricted to Π1-formulas, and
¬PrT(0= 1) is the consistency statement for T.
In the PACI-setting we must previously say what the Σ1-class and the Π1-class can be. First, the Σ0-class is formed by
positive classical propositional combinations of atomic formulas of the form f = g , f and g recursive terms (as established
in [4] and [14] we employ a language with the only predicate = (.,.) and the names of all recursive functions). The reasons
of the exclusion from F of the intensional connectives ¬ and ◦(.) is obvious. Then, the class of Σ1-sentences of PACI
includes elements of the form ∃x1 . . .∃xr F , F ∈ Σ0. But the negation ¬F with F ∈ Σ0 is neither in Σ0 nor in Σ1. Indeed, as
already shown in [4], we remind that, in PRACI, not only ¬ f = g has an intensional character which makes it completely
different from the Boolean complement of f = g , but also the standard Σ1-property ¬ f = g → PrPRACI(¬ f = g) does not
hold, i.e. ¬ f = g cannot be considered as PRACI-equivalent to a Σ1-formula. Thus, on one hand, the Π1-class must be
split at least into two classes of formulas: Π1a ≡ {¬∃x1 . . .∃xr F } and Π1b ≡ {∀x1 . . .∀xr F }, with F ∈ Σ0; on the other hand,
∀x¬(r = s) cannot be seen as the universal quantiﬁcation of a Σ0- or Σ1-formula. Then, we exclude ∀x1 . . .∀xr¬F , F ∈ Σ0,
from the Π1-class of the PACI-setting. After this, by arithmetical semantics of PACI, we shall prove that absolute consistency of
PACI and reﬂection principle RfnΠ1a(PACI) restricted to Π1a-formulas cannot be PACI-equivalent.
As to the ω-consistency, we recall that in the classical setting, if T is an axiomatizable extension of PRA, ω-consistency of
T can be formalized as (see [22, p. 853]) PrT(∃xB(x)) → ∃x¬PrT[¬B(x)], where B has only x free. We write Σk-ω-consistency
for the restriction of the schema to formulas B ∈ Σk . We have that, over PRA (and then over PA), the Σ1-restricted reﬂection
principle RfnΣ1(T) and Σ0-ω-consistency of T are equivalent. Conversely, we shall prove by arithmetical semantics of PACI
that such equivalence does not hold in LFI-based paraconsistent Arithmetic, that is RfnΣ1(PACI) and Σ0-ω-consistency of PACI are
not equivalent over PACI.
11.2. Future works: looking for a conjectural reasoning naturally arising from LFI-based Arithmetic
A further different topic that can be investigated concerns the conjectural reasoning that can be expressed inside PACI,
that should represent a peculiar property of LFI-based arithmetical systems w.r.t. classical Arithmetic. That is, we will
explore the following problem: what are the contradictions F ∧ ¬F of the PA-language (which is included in the PACI-
language) that result as true in the arithmetical models of PACI? This is a relevant question, since we could see such sentences
as constructive conjectures (and then neither probabilistic nor possibilistic) having a mathematical interest, in particular in
the cases where F is PA-consistent, or both F and ¬F are PA-consistent. Besides the class of (arithmetical) constructive
conjectures, also the class of (arithmetical) paradoxical assertions could be interesting: a paradoxical assertion is each non-
atomic sentence A of the PA-language which is a proper PA-theorem and is falsiﬁed by any arithmetical model 〈N,PA,ϕ〉
of PACI. The class of paradoxical assertions would be not empty. Assuming that inﬁnitely many instances ¬(F ∧ ¬F ) of
the non-contradiction principle in the PA-language are falsiﬁed by suitable arithmetical models of PACI, as for the CI-
language happens (Section 9), if G is a proper PA-theorem, then G ∧ ¬(F ∧ ¬F ) is a paradoxical assertion. Thus, we have
the (apparent) arithmetical semantics paradox: provability logic of PA falsiﬁes inﬁnitely many proper PA-theorems.
Obviously, paradoxical assertions of the form G ∧ ¬(F ∧ ¬F ) would not be really relevant from a mathematical point of
view. An open research problem is to ﬁnd both constructive conjectures and paradoxical assertions that can be mathemati-
cally relevant.
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